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multifaceted  character  of  price;  recent  insights  into  the  con- 
sumer’s  decision  process  with  respect  to  price;  price  as  an 
indicator  of quality.  This  general  treatment  of the  consumer’s 
behavior  towards  prices  serves  as a basis  for the  evaluation  of 
pricing  strategies,  such  as  price  promotion  strategies,  multi- 
product  pricing,  and  dynamic  and  new  product  pricing.  The 
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price  effects,  and  indicates  directions  for future  research. 
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1.  Introduction 
During  the  last  decades,  marketing  schol- 
ars  and  practitioners  have  become  aware  of 
the  importance  of developing  an appropriate 
pricing  strategy,  and  of  the  complexity  of 
such a task. This has resulted  in a “boost”  of 
descriptive  and predictive research, which has 
enhanced  our  understanding,  while  raising 
even more  questions. 
This paper  is an attempt  to summarize  the 
dominant  research  streams  in  the  recent 
marketing  literature  on  pricing.  Previous  re- 
views by Monroe  and  Della  Bitta (1978) and 
Rao  (1984) provide  a picture  of this area  up 
to  1984. We  review  publications  since  that 
date. 
A  number  of  limitations  of  this  review 
should  be  mentioned.  First,  it is largely con- 
fined  to contributions  that  appeared  in mar- 
keting  publications.  No  doubt,  interesting 
thoughts  on  pricing  can  be  found  e.g.  in 
Economic,  Decision  Sciences,  and  Strategy 
journals  and  working  papers.  Second,  we 
found  that  the recent  marketing  publications 
on  pricing  exhibit  a  strong  consumer  goods 
bias.  In  an  attempt  to  provide  a  coherent 
contribution,  we  also  opted  to  concentrate 
this  review  on  pricing  in  consumer  market- 
ing. Third,  we do not  pretend  to be exhaus- 
tive.  Our  interest  lies  mainly  in  identifying 
and  commenting  upon  major  research 
streams  of  current  interest  in  the  area.  Fi- 
nally,  some  issues,  though  related  to  our 
subject,  arc  not  included  since  thuy  consti- 
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tute  a  vast  topic  on  their  own.  This  is  the 
case  for  e.g.  Transfer  Pricing,  Competitive 
Bidding,  and  for  the  literature  on  Market 
Structuring,  in which  price  elasticities  play  a 
major  role. 
The  recent  pricing  literature  contains  a 
huge  number  of  findings.  In  an  attempt  to 
“‘structure”  and  position  these,  we  organize 
the  discussion  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we 
ce  the  integrative  paper  b:-  Tellis 
(1986). which  forms  an  interesting  basis  for 
our  overview, as it provides  an excellent  syn- 
the  economic  principles  behind  nu- 
merous  pricing  strategies.  It  indicates  the 
determinants  of pricing  problems,  but 
needs  to  be  supplemented  with  detailed  in- 
sights and  more  recently  stressed  dimensions 
of  pricing.  The  latter  are  dealt  with  in  Sec- 
tions  3 to 8. Section  9, finally,  indicates  some 
promising  topics for  future  research. 
s’ unifying  taxonomy 
The  literature  on  pricing  proposes  an 
overwhelming  number  of  pricing  principles, 
strategies  and  tactics,  and  an  even  larger 
number  of  names  to  denote  them.  To  find 
some  order  in  this  chaos  was  a  challenge 
Table  1 
Tellis’  unifying  taxonomy  of  pricing  strategies 
many  marketing  practitioners  did  not  feel 
eager  to  take  up.  Moreover,  as indicated  by 
Little  (1984),  the  marketing  discipline  had 
been  main!y  concerned  with  prescri 
search,  leaving the analysis of theore 
behavioral  underpinnings  to economic  schol- 
ars. 
The  1986 paper  by  Tellis  has  filled  this 
void.  Prior  to  discussing  it,  it  is  crucial  to 
point  out that  pricing strategies  comprise  two 
elements:  price  structures,  and  price  levels 
(Stern,  1986). The  strategic  use of price  first 
implies  a thorough  reflection  on appropriate 
pricing  structures  or  schemes,  within  which 
specific  levels (monetary  prices)  will next  be 
set. Based  on the proposition  that  the choice 
of  an  appropriate  pricing  scheme  derives 
from  the  identification  of  “share 
omies”,  Tellis  proposes  a unifying  taxonomy 
for the  pricing  principles  found  in the  litera- 
ture. 
His  classification  relates  to  two  basic  di- 
mensions.  The  first is the  pricing  objectille  of 
the  firm:  what  “shared  economies”  are 
sought  for?  Given  the  overall  objective  of 
profit  maximization,  does  the  company  want 
to (a) exploit consumer  heterogeneity  through 
differential  pricing,  (b)  use  competitive  pric- 
ing,  to  exploit  competitive  position,  and/or 
Dimension  2:  Dimension  1: Company  objective 
consumer 
characteristics 
Vary  prices  among 
consumer  segments 
Exploit 
competitive  position 
Balance  pricing 
over  product  line 
Differcrl: 
search  COYI\ 
random  discounting 
(price  merchandising, 
cents  off,  coupons) 
_- 
price  signaling 
dreferencc  pricing) 
image  pricing 
Different 
reservatior  prices 
periodic  discounting 
(price  skimming, 
peak  load  pricing) 
penetration 
and  experience 
curve  pricing 
(limit  pricing) 
price  bundling 
prilmium  pricing 
Special 
transaction  costs 
second  market 
discounting 
(dumping,  gcncric 
pricing) 
geographic  pricing 
(FOB,  zor~  pricing) 
complementary 
pricing  (two  part  pricing, 
low  Ic;~l~~r~hip 
Sours:  ddipted  from  Tclli4  ( IWO). 
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(c) balance  prices  over  the  assortment  using  life, a manager  may find  himself in different 
product  line  pricing?  The  second  dimension  “cells”  at  the  same time,  and  face the  pr&- 
reflects  the  characteristics of  customers;  de-  lem of combining various  principles  into one 
pending  on differences  in (a) search costs, (b)  set  of  pricing  rules.  By  its  nature,  Tellis’ 
transaction  costs  and/or  (c)  reservation  article  leaves  room  for  further  research  on 
prices  among  them,  alternative  pricing  specific  dimensions  of  pricing  to  enhance 
strategies  will be called  for.  theoretical,  empirical  and normative  insights. 
These  two dimensions  (at  three  levels) re- 
sult  in Table  1, where  each  cell corresponds 
to  a  “typical”  pricing  strategy.  Tellis  de- 
scribes  the  necessary  conditions  for  each 
strategy  to be meaningful.  The typical  pricing 
situations  are  illustrated,  and variants  of the 
basic pricing principles  are  mentioned.  ’ 
Tellis’ paper  is a major contribution  to the 
marketing  discipline.  It  presents  a variety  of 
pricing  strategies  in  comparable  terms, 
demonstrates  relationships  among them,  and 
identifies  the  basic  economic  principles  be- 
hind  them.  It indicates  crucial problem  char- 
acteristics  in  the  choice  of  an  appropriate 
pricing  method  and  calls  for  attention  to  (i) 
the  presence  of  (and  interrelationship  be- 
tween)  segments  in the  market,  (ii) the  inter- 
action  with competitors  and (iii) the  product 
line  context.  It  also  stresses  the  need  for 
insight  into  the  consumers’  decision  process: 
issues such as the multidimensional  nature  of 
a  “price”  (e.g.  including  transportation  and 
nonmonetary  costs),  the  lack of price  knowl- 
edge  by consumers,  and  differences  in price 
sensitivity  are  seen  to matter. 
This  paper  reviews  a  number  such  re- 
search  efforts,  structured  around  the  follow- 
ing  topics:  the  multifaceted  character  of 
price,  recent  insights into the consumer’s de- 
cision  process  with respect  to price, price  as 
an  indicator  of  quality.  This  general  treat- 
ment  of  the  consumer’s  behavior  towards 
prices  serves  as a basis for  the  evaluation  of 
pricing  strategies  such  as  price  promotion 
strategies,  multiproduct  pricing, and dynamic 
and new product  pricing. 2 Section 9 summa- 
rizes  some  thoughts  on  the  measurement  of 
price  effects.  Section  10,  finally,  contains 
concluding  comments  and  directions  for  fu- 
ture  research. 
3.  The  multifaceted  character  of prkx 
As  a “simple”  integrative  scheme,  the  pa- 
per can provide only an indirect  treatment  of 
some  important  issues.  Dynamics  (e.g.  con- 
sumer  and  competitive  learning  or  the  im- 
pact  of  brand  loyalty  and  variety  seeking 
behavior)  are only implicitly  referred  to, and 
so is the  role of channel  intermediaries.  As a 
conceptual  framework,  it  does  not  provide 
managers  with  practical  guidelines.  In  real 
The  recent  literature  recognizes  the  com- 
plexity  and  multifaceted  character  of  the 
price  concept.  Many  marketers  advocate  a 
“broadened”  price  definition,  such  as  Zeit- 
ham1 (1988): “From  the  consumer’s point  of 
view, price  is what is given up or sacrificed to 
obtain  a  product”.  Zeithaml  identifies  the 
major price components  to be objective price, 
perceived  nonmonetary  price  and  sacrifice 
(an  integration  of  both).  In  doing  SO, she 
extends  the classical narrow price definition  3 
in  mainly  two  ‘ways by  (i)  recognizing  the 
I  For  a  more  extensive  descriptior  of  the  taxonomy  and 
characterization  of  pricing  strategitts,  the  reader  is referred 
to  the  original  article  S~lcct~d  strategies  ;tnd  situations  will 
be  A-alt  with  n-m-t’ cxtcnsivcly  in  i he  course  of  thiv  paper. 
2 Sections 3,  4  (and  5)  elaborate  on  the  consumer’s  decision 
process,  and  are  largely  related  to  the  second  dimension  in 
Tellis’s  scheme.  Sections  6,  8  and  7  deal  with  major  aspects 
in  the  respective  columns  of  Tellis’s  matrix. 
3  AF  example  of  a  narrow  definition  is found  in  Simon  (198Q): 
“The  price  of  3  product  c?r service  is  the  number  of  mone- 
tary  units  a  customer  has  to  pay  to  receive  one  unit  of  that 
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relevance  of nonmonetary  price  components 
and  (ii)  stressing  the  possible  gap  between 
objective  and perceived  prices. 
Along  the  same  lines,  Murphy  and  Enis 
(1986)  make  a  distinction  between  the  “ef- 
fort”  and  the  “risk”  dimension  of  an  ax- 
tended  price  concept;  effort  is  defined  as 
“the  objective  amount  of money  and  time  it 
takes  to  make  a  purchase”;  risk  stands  for 
“the  buyer’s  subjective  assessment  of  the 
consequences  of  making  a  purchasing  mis- 
take”.  Again,  these  authors  explicitly  distin- 
guish  between  monetary  and  nonmonetary 
price  components. 
Monetary  effort  is  not  confined  to  the 
amount  of “cash”  to be paid,  other  elements 
such  as credit  and  countertrade  may be rele- 
vant.  Kirby  and  Dardis  (1986) stress  the  im- 
portance  of  terms  of  payment  (credit  plans 
and  the  possibility  of  using  credit  cards)  in 
consumer  evaluation  of  monetary  effort. 
Meyer  and  Assunsao  (1990)  point  to  the 
relevance  of inventory  costs  in dynamic  pur- 
chase  decisions.  Nonmonetary  effort  mainly 
refers  to “time  prices”,  e.g. travel,  shopping, 
waiting  and  product  usage  time.  Search  and 
transaction  costs  mainly  fall  under  this  c!pe 
of  effort.  Risk  encompasses  financial  risk, 
Objective  monetary  price 
I 
I 
Perceived  monetary  price  Perceived 
Nonmonetary 




Perceived  Sacrifice 
Perceived  Quality 
I 
Perceived  Value 
Purchase  Intention 
and  also  includes  the  social,  psychological, 
physical  and  functional  consequences  of 
making  the  wrong  purchase.  According  to 
Funkhauser  and  Parker  (1986),  consumers 
must  ultimately  cover  the  total  costs  of  all 
necessary  channel  functions,  such  as financ- 
ing, inventory,  storage,  transportation,  spoil- 
age  or  damage,  equipment,  and  handling. 
They  may  prefer  to  G  so by  personally  ex- 
pending  time,  effort  risk  and/or  anxiety  or 
by  paying  a  higher  price.. Hence,  consumers 
face  a  trade  off  decision  involving  a  wide 
variety  of “cost”  and  “p,rice”  aspects. 
Many  recent  contributions  emphasize  the 
importance  of different  price dimensions,  and 
recognize  the  complex  role  of  price  in  the 
consumer’s  purchasing  decision  (e.g.  Mc- 
Goldrick  and Marks,  -4987;  Murphy  and Enis, 
1.986). Erickson  and  lohansson  (1985) state 
that  “.  . .  the role price plays in a consumer’s 
evaluation  of  product  alternatives  is  very 
possibly  not  a unidimensiona!  one  . . . “,  and 
distinguish  bxetween the  reduction  of wealth 
caused  by  prices  (“price  as  a  constraint”), 
and  the  information  on  product  quality  con- 
veyed  by  prices  (“price  as  a  product  at- 
tribute”).  Again,  these  authors  stress  the  im- 
portance  of  price  perceptions,  and  the  im- 
Purchase 
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pact  of  “price  beliefs”  on  consumer  atti- 
tudes. 
These  thoughts  on the  role of price  in the 
consumer’s  decision  process  can be schemat- 
ically  represented  as  in  Fig.  1. This  scheme 
should  further  be  placed  in  a  dynamic  set- 
ting.  Including  the  time  dimension  consider- 
ably  adds  to  the  complexity  of the  decision 
process,  as will be clarified  below. 
The  use  of  a  broadened  price  concept  is 
not  new  in  marketing  (and  certainly  not  in 
economics),  but  it  has  clearly  gained 
widespread  acceptance.  The  multidimen- 
sional  view  on  prices  has  become  the  rule 
rather  than  the  exception.  It  has  led  to  (i) 
increased  awareness  of  the  variety  of  possi- 
ble  price  implications,  since  the  role  of  dif- 
ferent  price  dimensions  will  vary  between 
consumers  and  product  types,  and  interact 
with  market(ing)  characteristics,  and  (ii) 
recognition  that  complex  pricing  schemes 
may  be  needed,  appropriate  to  particular 
situations.  At the  heart  of these observations 
lies a revived  interest  in the  dynamics  of the 
consumers’  decision  process, 
4.  The  role  of  price  in  the  consumer’s  deci- 
sion  process 
4.1  The reference price concept 
As  indicated  by  AssunGao  and  Meyer 
(1990),  the  traditional  literature  on  pricing 
starts  from the simple  assumption  that,  when 
faced  with  a  buying  decision  in  a  product 
category,  consumers  observe  a  price,  take 
into  account  their  current  inventory  position 
in  the  category,  and  make  the  brand/quan- 
tity  decision  that  maximizes  immediate  util- 
ity. 
Currently,  an  expanded  notion  of price  is 
applied  to  the  study  of  consumer  purchase 
behavior,  both  for  frequently  purchased  and 
for  durable  products.  Observed  price  insta- 
bility  in  the  market  results  in  consumers 
forming  “reference”  prices. These  “expected 
prices”  are multidimensional  constructs com- 
posed  of more  than  the  actual  (retail)  price. 
They  are  compared  with the  observed  levels, 
and the  discrepancy  between  anticipated  and 
actual  prices  affects  brand  choice  and  pur- 
chase  quantity.  4 
The  notion  that  consumers  compare  ob- 
served  prices  with some  internal  standard  is 
supported  by  a  growing  body  of  literature, 
and  supplements  standard  economic  theor;r 
on price  information  processing.  It is closely 
related  to the  Prospect  Theory  of Kahneman 
and  Tversky  (1979), who state  that:  “.  . .  our 
perceptual  apparatus  is attuned  to the evalu- 
ation  of  changes  rather  than  to  the  evalua- 
tion  of absolute  magnitudes”.  It is also con- 
sistent with the notion of “transaction  utility” 
presented  by Thaler (1985), who suggests that 
the  probability  of purchasing  a brand  is af- 
fected  by  the  attractiveness  of  the  transac- 
tion  or  deal,  this  “transaction  utility”  being 
larger  (more  positive) to  the  extent  that  the 
retail  price  compares  favorably  with  the  ex- 
pected  price.  With  respect  to  the  decision 
scheme  presented  in  Section  3,  Reference 
Price  Theory  provides  interesting  thoughts 
on  price  perception,  and  price  evaluation, 
over time. 
In  discussing the  reference  price concept, 
three  issues  deserve  special  attention:  the 
definition  of  reference  prices,  their  forma- 
tion,  and  the  supporting  empirical  evidence. 
4.1.1  The meaning of a reference price 
The  literature  proposes  a diversity of con- 
ceptual  and  operational  definitions of refer- 
ence  prices (Jacobson  and Obermiller,  1990). 
4 We  use  the  term:  “reference  price”  to  denote  the  con- 
sumers’ internal  standard for price evaluation. This internal 
level  can  be  influenced  by externally  provided “standards 
for  comparison”,  such  as  the  (barredi  regular  prices  in 
advertisements  announcing  a  temporary  price  cut.  These 
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The  notion  of reference  price  may be related 
to  the  concept  of  price  limits  (Gabor  and 
&anger,  1964), which  customers  are  willing 
to pay  for  a product;  the  lower price  thresh- 
old  could  stem  from  price-quality  percep- 
tions,  while  the  upper  bound  is  often  re- 
ferred  to  as  the  reservation  price.  Both 
boundaries  may serve  as a “reference  level”, 
SO  that  outside  these  limits,  the  price  consti- 
tutes  a  primary  barrier  to  purchase  (Gabor, 
1988). Numerous  other  reference  price  defi- 
nitions  have  been  put  forward,  such  as 
“aspiration  prices”,  prices  based  on  con- 
sumer  targets  or budget  constraints.  Many  of 
these  concepts  are  only  weakly  related  to 
actual  prices  (Jacobson  and  Obermiller, 
1990). 
A  more  common  view  reduces  the  notion 
of  reference  price  to  that  of  a  “fair”  or 
“appropriate”  price.  In deciding  what  is fair, 
the consumer  was traditionally  believed  to be 
“backward  looking”,  and  to form  a standard 
based  on  past  experience  (e.g. Winer,  1986). 
Recent  contributions  propose  that,  in  a  dy- 
namic  setting,  consumers  can  be  “forward 
looking”:  their  reference  price  is also  influ- 
enced  by  expectations  of  future  prices  (As- 
sunsao  and Meyer,  1990; Kalwani et al., 1990; 
Jacobson  and  Obermiller,  1990). This  would 
imply  that  the  relationship  between  price 
and  purchase  (quantity)  at  a certain  point  in 
time  also  reflects  future  price  expectations, 
especially  in cases  where  (i) the  purchase  is 
postponable,  (ii) price  is a significant  consid- 
eration  in the  decision  process  and  (iii) con- 
sumers  have  some  idea  about  future  price 
levels (Jacobson  and  Obermiller,  1990). 
A  number  of  authors  postulate  that  con- 
sumers,  instead  of holding  a single reference 
value,  “know”  the  distribution of retail  prices 
for an  item,  such  as  the  lowest  and  highest 
market  price,  the  average  level,  and  a  price 
for  individual  retailers  (e.g.  Monroe,  1990; 
Urbany  et  al., 1989; Biswas and  Blair,  1991). 
In  evaluating  observed  prices,  the  lowest 
price  (or:  “shopping  around  price”)  estimate 
may  be  used  as  the  ultimate  internal  stsn- 
dard  (Biswas and Blair,  1991). Which “inter- 
nal  price”  serves  as a  comparison  level  in  a 
particular  buying  situation  must  depend  on 
many  factors,  including  the  consumer’s  time 
and  transaction  costs. 
4.1.2 Models of reference price formation 
Besides  the  elements  involved  in  the  for- 
mation  of  reference  prices,  the  formation 
process  itself  has been  discussed.  The  direct 
measurement  of  reference  prices  is  not 
straightforward  (Winer,  1986). Some authors 
have  tried  to  elicit  reference  prices  directly 
from  consumers  (e.g.,  Kalwani  and  Yim, 
1992). But  most  attempts  to  provide  support 
for  Reference  Price  Theory,  and  to  gain  in- 
sight  into  the  formation  process,  approach 
reference  prices  as “unobservable  variables”. 
Alternative  models  for  unobservable  refer- 
ence  prices  have been  developed  and  tested 
against  each other,  such as the “extrapolative 
expectations  hypothesis”  (in  which observed 
past  price  and a trend  variable  determine  the 
reference  price),  the  “serial  correlakion 
model”  (price  expectations  depend  on  cur- 
rent  price  and  a  serially  correlated  error), 
and  the  “rational  expectations  model”,  (con- 
sumers  are  assumed  to  discover  the  rules 
used  in price  setting,  and  are  able to formu- 
late  unbiased  and  efficient  forecasts).  Lattin 
and  Bucklin  (1989)  make  a  distinction  be- 
tween  reference  formation  for  regular  and 
for  promotional  prices.  They  posit  that  past 
purchase  behavior  as  well  as  exposure  to 
price  levels and  promotional  actions  may  af- 
fect  internal  standards.  They  propose  a 
“threshold  model”  for  the  formation  of pro- 
motional  reference  levels, where  a minimum 
level of exposure  to deals  is required  before 
the  internal  standard  is adapted. 
4.1.3 Empirical evidence 
The  extensive  literature  on  reference 
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We can only summarize  some of the findings, 
which seem to suggest that  5 
(i)  in many  instances,  the  use of a refer- 
ence  price  in  (aggregate)  consumer  brand 
choice  ,models yields  a better  fit, 
(ii)  the  inclusion  of future  price  expecta- 
tions  gains support, 
(iii)  consumers  have  “bounded”  rational- 
ity:  there  is  little  support  for  the  rational 
expectations  model  and  evidence  of learning 
is weak, 
(iv)  there  is a region of insensitivity around 
a brand’s  expected  price,  within which  price 
changes  do  not  alter  consumers’  price  per- 
ceptions, 
(v)  the  process  of  expected  price  forma- 
tion  is influenced  by contextual  variables  and 
other  marketing  mix activities. 
The  reference  price  theory  of  consumer 
behavior  may  have  implications  for  price 
strategy.  This will be especially  true  in situa- 
tions  involving dynamic  price  rules  (e.g. pro- 
motional  pricing,. penetration  pricing or price 
skimming  for  new products),  where  the  for- 
mation  of expected  prices  may considerably 
affect  consumer  price  sensitivity. 
Recent  findings on consumer  price  aware- 
ness and knowledge, however, have led some 
authors  to  doubt  the  relevance  of  the  refer- 
ence  price  concept,  as discussed  next. 
4.2  Evidence on consumer  price atwareness  and 
price knowledge 
As  McGoldrick  and  Marks  (1985) discuss, 
the  assumption  of early  economic theory  that 
consumers  are aware of item prices, has been 
discredited  for  long.  Nevertheless,  the  leve! 
of consumer  price  knowledge  remains  a vital 
5 For  more  detailed  information  concerning  these  issues,  the 
interested  reader is referred to Winer (1986); Kalwani et al. 
(1986,  19901,  Gurumurthy  and  Little  (1987),  Lattin  and 
Bucklin  (19891, Meyer  and Assuni;ao (19901, Jacobson and 
Obermiller  (1990),  Holak  et  al.  (1987).  Tellis  and  Gaeth 
(199Ob, Assunpo  and Meyer (19901. hswas  and Blair  (1991) 
and Kalwani  and Yim  (1992). 
issue  for  decision  makers.  In  recent  years, 
there  has  been  growing  evidence  of,  and 
concern  about,  the  decreasing  price  aware- 
ness  of  the  consumer.  We will examine  this 
issue in more detail,  and evaluate  its implica- 
tions  for Reference  Price Theory. 
4.21  TO  price or  not to price:  The story of the 
uninfowned consumer 
Earlier  work (e.g. Zeithaml,  1982; Dickson 
and  Sawyer,  1986; Conover,  1986) suggested 
that  consumers’  knowledge  of  specific  item 
prices  is far  from perfect.  Recent  studies  of 
consumer  awareness  of  specific  price  levels 
in  supermarkets  found  the  level  of  price 
knowledge  and  search  to  be  alarmingly  low. 
Dickson  and  Sawyer (1990) asked  shoppers 
about  their  price checking behavior and price 
recall  immediately  after  they  had selected  an 
item  from  the  shelf,  so  that  bias  due  to 
“forgetting”  was  minimized.  Their  anaivsis 
involved  four  product  classes: coffee,  todth- 
paste,  margarine  and cold cereal. They found 
low  levels  of  information  processing  at  the 
point  of  purchase:  only  half  (58%)  of  the 
shoppers  spent  more  than  5 seconds  at  the 
product  category display, or checked the price 
of the  chosen item. The  price recall accuracy 
of consumers  was distressing:  about  20%  of 
the  shoppers  had no idea of the price of the 
chosen  item;  there  was  a  tendency  for  con- 
sumers  to  underestimate  item  prices,  and 
only  55%  of  them  gave  an  “accurate”  esti- 
mate  (within 5% of the  exact price). Aware- 
ness of price  specials was also very low: less 
than  half of the consumers  buying on special 
knew of the  reduced  price.  McGoldrick  and 
Marks (1987) and Krishna et al. (1991) report 
similar  results.  Another  finding  is that  con- 
sumers  are  conservative  updaters  of  priors, 
i.e. that  learning  is very limited. 
Overall,  these  studies  reveal  that  con- 
sumers  do  not  always  know  or  remember 
product  prices, and  that  many do not  attend 
to  price  information.  Possible  reasons  for 
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(1987)  claim  that  the  change  in  the  grocery 
environment  accounts  for  much  of  the  de- 
crease  in  price  awareness.  McGoldrick  and 
Marks  (19L3)  document  the  complexity  of 
price  information  in retail  settings  and  point 
to  the  lack  of  standardization  in  sizes  and 
packages.  Tellis  and  Gaeth  (1990)  mention 
the  proliferation  of  competing  brands,  the 
difficulty  of exhaustive  search  and  sampling, 
the  high rate  of product  innovation,  biases  in 
the  evaluation  of  products,  and  consumer 
mobility.  All  these  facets  confirm  the  multi- 
dimensional  character  of price,  and  the  com- 
plexity of price  information  processing. 
4.2.2  Is  the  end  of  Reference  Price  Theory 
near? 
The  previous  findings  question  the validity 
of  Reference  Price  Theory,  at  least  in  the 
context  of  grocery  shopping  (Dickson  and 
Sawyer,  1990). Zeithaml  (1988)  states  that: 
“Levels  of  consumer  attention,  awareness 
and  knowledge  of prices  seem  to  be  consid- 
erably  lower than  necessary  for consumers  to 
have  accurate  internal  reference  prices  for 
many  products”. 
Is the end of Reference  Price Theory  near? 
Probably  not, and  this  for  several  reasons. 
First,  studies  have  mainly  analyzed  fre- 
quently  purchased  products  in a supermarket 
context.  For  these  “convenience”  goods,  ab- 
solute price  is typically  a less crucial determi- 
nant.  Attention  to  prices  may  be  higher  for 
higher  priced  goods,  durables  and  services 
(Zeithaml,  1988). Whether  this  implies  more 
accurate  price  knowledge  is  another  issue, 
since  information  gathering  for  these  prod- 
ucts is more  costly and  complex. 
Even  for  repeat  purchase  goods, the  level 
of recall  varies  greatly  across  product  classes 
and  brands:  knowledge  seems  to  be  more 
accurate  for  high  involvement  products, 
products  of budgetary  importance,  and  regu- 
larly purchased  items  or brands  (McGoldrick 
and  Marks,  1987; Dickson  and  Sawyer,  1990; 
Mammdar  and  Monroe,  1990). For  product 
classes  or  items  where  consumers  have  at 
least  some  perception  of  prices,  Reference 
Price Theory  may be valid. 
Second,  the  degree  of  price  knowledge 
and  the  level  of  price  vigilance  differs  be- 
tween  shoppers.  Some  consumers  seem  to 
have  accurate  information  on  prices  (they 
may  be  the  cause  for  price  sensitivity  ob- 
served  in the  market),  that  could  serve as an 
internal  standard  in  decision  making.  Re- 
search  to  characterize  these  price-knowl- 
edgeable  segments  is starting,  and  not  very 
conclusive yet (McGoldrick  and  Marks,  1987; 
Krishna  et al.,  1991; Zeithaml,  1988). 
Third,  even  for  consumers  without  (accu- 
rate)  perception  of item  prices,  the  principle 
of  expected  prices  may  still  hold.  However, 
these consumers  (or these  consumers  in these 
buying  situations)  will  likely  be  different  in 
their  way  of  price  encoding,  and  in  their 
reference  price  formation  process. 
4.2.3 Price encoding and the intricacies of the 
human mind 
Several  authors  have recognized  that  con- 
sumers  can  “encode”  price  information  in 
various ways (e.g. Zeithaml,  1988; Biswas and 
Blair,  1991;  Helgeson  and  Beat&  1987; 
Schindler  and  Wiman,  1989). This has led  to 
criticism  of  studies  that  used  specific  item 
price  recall  as  the  main  indicator  of  price 
awareness.  Mazumdar  and  Monroe  (1990) 
state  that,  since price stimuli  can be encoded 
in different  ways, future  research  should  use 
multiple  memory  tests  for  making  a  valid 
inference  about  price knowledge.  The way in 
which information  is recorded,  organized  and 
adjusted  in  memory  depends  on  many  fac- 
tors.  Determinants  of  price  encoding  could 
be the  importance  of price,  the  price ending, 
the  familiarity  with  the  brand,  but  also  the 
consistency  between  observed  and  expected 
price, or buyers’ processing  goals. Mazumdar 
and  Monroe  investigate  the  impact  of learn- 
ing goals  and  choice  task  on  price  encoding, 
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prices  for  later  use,  tend  to  retain  specific 
price  levels  more  accurately  than  e.g.  price 
ranks  relative  to  other  brands.  When  price 
information  is acquired  in the course of mak- 
ing  decisions,  relative  price  recall  is  better 
than  absolute  price  knowledge. 
An  interesting  perspective  on  consumer 
price  sensitivity,  price  recall  and encoding,  is 
offered  by  Krishnamurthi  and  Raj  (1988, 
19911,  who point  out that  consumer  decisions 
involve  a  discrete  choice  (which  brand)  as 
well  as  a continuous  decision  (quantity  pur- 
chased  of  the  chosen  brand).  They  suggest 
that  the  role of price  in these  two stages may 
be  different:  they  expect  brand  choice  to  be 
influenced  by  relative  price,  while  quantity 
decisions would be affected  by absolute  price 
level and income. Different  price encoding  is 
likely  to  take  place  depending  on  which  as- 
pect  of the decision  is of greater  importance. 
Reference  price  formation  and  price  en- 
coding  are  also  affected  by  “supporting” 
marketing  mix  actions.  Evidently,  promo- 
tional  signals  (advertising  or  point  of  pur- 
chase  material)  may be used to increase  con- 
sumer  attention  to  price  (specials)  (Dickson 
and  Sawyer,  1990; Jacobson  and  Obermiller, 
1990).  Further,  consumers  who  are  not 
knowledgeable  about  prices,  but  come  to 
consider  price as being important  at a certain 
point  in  time,  may  rely  on  externally  pro- 
vided  “ reference”  prices.  Finally,  certain 
consumers  (with a low “need  for cognition”) 
may  rely  on  promotional  signals  alone  to 
infer  that  a  price  cut  is offered,  even  if no 
actual  discount  is given (Inman  et  al.,  1990). 
Summarizing,  we can state  that  the  Refer- 
ence  Price  Theory  of  consumer  decision 
making  has gained  wide attention.  Empirical 
evidence  suggests  that  a  large  portion  of 
consumers,  at  least  for  some  product  cate- 
gories,  have  surprisingly  little  knowledge 
about  individual item prices, and do not seem 
to attend  to price  information.  This  suggests 
that  in  many  instances,  reference  prices  (if 
used)  are  not very  accurate,  or  not  based  on 
actual  price  information.  Consumers seem to 
be  quite  heterogeneous  in  their  levels  of 
price  attention,  their  ways of encoding price, 
and  their  degree  of price  knowledge. 
The  findings in this section have important 
implications  for  the  development  of  appro- 
priate  pricing  strategies.  Indeed,  the  frame- 
work of Tellis suggests that consumer hetero- 
geneity  in terms of price sensitivity and infor- 
mation  offers ample opportunities  for strate- 
gic pricing.  Stern (1989) formulates  it as fol- 
lows:  “Rarely  is  a  single  price  appropriate 
for  all  consumers.  As  Goldilocks  discovered 
with  the  three  bears’  porridge,  some  cus- 
tomers  will  find  that  single  price  too  high, 
. . . . others  too low, . . . . and only a few “just 
right”.  Using price  structure  to differentiate 
based  on  consumer  price  sensitivity  enables 
businesses  to  have their  porridge  and  eat  it 
too.” 
The  previous  discussion  also  highlighted 
the  link between  price and other  information 
cues  or  product  attributes,  a point  taken  up 
next. 
5.  Interactions  between  price  and quality 
An  important  linkage  discussed  in the  re- 
cent  literature  is  the  relationship  between 
price  and  product  quality.  The  research  can 
be divided into two streams:  (1) contributions 
investigating  the “objective”  relationship  be- 
tween price and quality levels, and (2) papers 
analyzing  the  perceived  association  between 
these  constructs. 
5.1 Are  market prices good indicators  of prod- 
uct quality? 
An  extensive  line of research  assesses  the 
link  between  actual  prices  and  “objective” 
quality,  e.g. measures  on performance  scales, 
or  quality  levels published  in Consumer  Re- 
ports. This has produced  mixed results, partly 
because  of methodological  difficulties and of 
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quality  construct  used).  On average,  the price 
quality  relationship  seems  to be positive,  but 
very  weak  (Tellis  and  Wernerfelt,  1987, re- 
port  an  average  correlation  of  0.27),  and 
highly variable  among product  classes (Tellis, 
1987;  Rao  and  Monroe,  1989;  Zeithaml, 
1988). Tellis  and Wernerfelt  (1987) present  a 
formal  model  of the  equilibrium  price-qual- 
ity  relationship  in  a  market  with  free  entry 
and  asymmetrically  informed  consumers. 
They  show that  the  price-quality  association 
is generally  increasing  with  the  level of con- 
sumer  information  (which,  in  turn,  tends  to 
be higher  for durables,  products  with  a wide 
range  of  prices,  and  unpackaged  products). 
The  presence  of  size  variations  in  product 
offerings  tends  to  weaken  the  relationship, 
since  higher  unit  prices  may  reflect  noneco- 
nomical  packages  rather  than  quality  differ- 
ences  (Gerstner,  1985).  The  link  seems  to 
become  weaker  over  time  (Curry  and  Riesz, 
1988; Lichtenstein  and  Burton,  1989). This 
can  be  explained  by  reduced  price  flexibility 
in later  stages of the  product  life cycle, caus- 
ing competitors  to  resort  to  promotional  ex- 
penditures  rather  than  true  quality  improve- 
ments  to attract  customers.  MarklIt efficiency 
and  pricing  practices  may  also  affect  the 
price-quality  relationship  (Lichtenstein  and 
Burton,  1989). Other  issues  that  require  at- 
tention  are  the  ease  with  which  quality  can 
be  observed,  the  homogeneity  of preference 
structures,  and  the  importance  of  word  of 
mouth. 
An  interesting  observation  (Tellis,  1987) is 
that  price  can never  be a perfect  indicator  of 
quality;  since,  then,  consumers  would  buy 
“price”  without  quality  inspection,  and  this 
very  fact  would  incite  some  firms  to  cheat 
(and  thus  weaken  the  relationship). 
5.2  The perception of price  as a quality signal 
A  second  research  stream  is  concerned 
with  behavioral  issues.  It  investigates  per- 
ceived  price-quality  links,  the  relationship 
between  true  and perceived  price-quality  as- 
sociations,  and,  more  generally,  the  strate- 
gies used by consumers  in coping with imper- 
fect  quiity  information  (risk).  Zeithaml 
(1988) provides  an  interesting  overview  and 
states  that:  “Though  consumer  perceptions 
of  price,  quality  and  value  are  considered 
pivotal  determinants  of  shopping  behavior 
and  product  choice,  research  on  these  con- 
cepts  and  their  linkages  has  provided  few 
conclusive findings”.  A fundamental  problem 
in  this  research  is  that  the  concepts  (per- 
ceived price,  quality  and value)  are not prop- 
erly  defined.  Similarly,  Rao  and  Monroe 
(1989)  find  that  evidence  on  a  positive 
price-perceived  quality  relationship  from 
various  studies  has  been  moderated  by 
“methodological  deficiencies,  a  variety  of 
contextual  and situational  factors,  and a weak 
theoretical  explanation”.  Their  1989  meta 
analysis  of  41  studies  investigating  the 
price-perceived  quality  relationship,  found 
that  the  type  of experimental  design and  the 
degree  of  price  manipulation  had  a  signifi- 
cant  impact  on  the  results.  The  number  of 
manipulated  information  cues  (such  as  ad- 
vertising  or  brand  name)  might  affect  the 
observed  relationship  (though  no  significant 
effects  emerged  from  their  study),  especially 
if  different  cues  provide  inconsistent  infor- 
mation. 
Several  papers  have  tried  to  idc;ztifv the  ” 
conditions  under  which consumers  use  price 
to  infer  quality  (e.g.  Monroe  and  Krishnan, 
1985; Lichtenstein  and  Burton,  1989; Tellis, 
1987; Gorn  et al., 1990). Factors  affecting the 
use  of  price  as  a  quality  indicator  can  be 
classified  as  informational,  individual,  and 
product  category-related  elements.  Product 
categ3r-y  factors  are  the  level  of  product 
complexity  and  perceived  risk,  the  category 
price  level  and  range,  and  the  market  effi- 
ciency and pricing mechanism.  Individual  and 
informational  factors  refer  to  the  relevance 
of search  time  and other  nonmonetary  costs, 
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the  consumer,  the  importance  of  price  and 
quality  to the consumer,  and the  presence  of 
different  internal  (intrinsic  to the  “physical” 
product)  and  external  information  cues.  At 
present,  however,  no  conclusive  evidence  is 
available  on these  issues. Recent  research  on 
the  price-quality  relationship  evolves in two 
directions: 
(i)  Analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
price  as a quality  indicator  and the  presence 
of other  information  cues. Some authors  (Rao 
and  Monroe,  1989; Zeithaml,  1988) suggest 
that  the role of price may have been  overesti- 
mated,  and  that  other  extrinsic  cues  such  as 
brand  name  and  package  size are  equally  or 
more important,  especially for package goods. 
(ii)  Analysis  of  the  overall  choice  strate- 
gies  available  to  consumers  having  incom- 
plete  quality  information,  and  identification 
of  the  conditions  (purchase  situation,  con- 
sumer  characteristics)  under  which  these 
strategies  are  advisable  or  actually  used.  In- 
teresting  contributions  are the studies  of Tel- 
lis  (1987),  who  analyzes  four  basic  choice 
processes  (Informed,  High  price,  Low  price 
and  Random)  and  Tellis  and  Gaeth  (1990), 
who study  the  adoption  of Price  Seeking  (or 
High  Price),  Price  Aversion  (or  Low  Price) 
and  Best Value  strategies. 
In  summary,  the  price-quality  literature 
available  so  far  suggests  that  the  objective 
price-quality  relationship  is  positive,  weak, 
and  strongly  situation  dependent.  Concern- 
ing  the  link  between  price  and  perceived 
quality,  the evidence  suggests that  under  cer- 
tain  conditions,  consumers  may use  price  as 
a  quality  indicator.  This  appears  to  leave 
room  for the  use of price  signaling strategies 
mentioned  by  Tellis  (1986).  There  is  much 
heterogeneity  among  consumers  here. 
6.  Price promotion strategies 
A “favorite”  recent  topic of many market- 
ing scholars  is the  evaluation  of sales promo- 
tion  strategies.  The  budgets  spent  on  Sales 
Promotion  by  marketing  managers,  and  the 
number  of  articles  published  on  this  issue, 
have reached  unprecedented  heights. 
The “bulk”  of sales promotion  actions take 
the  form  of  a  straight  price  cut  or  of  an 
indirect  price  reduction  (e.g. in the form of a 
coupon  or  extra  quantity);  the  price  offer  is 
usually  accompanied  by  other  (supporting) 
marketing  actions  such  as  advertising.  Typi- 
cal of price  promotions  is their  “temporary” 
character.  Reduced  prices  or “deals”  are  of- 
fered  to the  consumer  over a short period  of 
time.  Such  temporary  price  cuts  have  be- 
come  “common  practice”.  This overview will 
be  limited  to  papers  on  direct  price  promo- 
tions.  Even  so, the number  of papers  is con- 
siderable.  First,  we  look  at  the  “general” 
effects  of  price  promotions  on  sales  and 
profit,  both  empirically  and  from  an  eco- 
nomic-behavioral  point  of view. One  obser- 
vation  that  clearly  emerges  from  the  litera- 
ture  is the  dominant  effect  of channel  inter- 
dependencies  on  the  development  of  price 
promotion  actions.  Second,  we  take  a  brief 
look at the (limited number  of) contributions 
dealing  with  manufacturer-retailer  interac- 
tions. The  third section complements  the dis- 
cussion with specific issues in retailer  (price) 
promotion. 
6.1  The impact of price promotions on brand 
outcomes 
6.1.1 Empirical evidence on the impact of price 
promotions 
The  measurement  of  sales  promotion  ef- 
fects  has  generated  a great  deal  of research 
interest  in recent  years.  The  availability  and 
improved  quality  of (weeklyj  scanner  data  at 
the  market,  store  or  household  level  im- 
proves  the  opportunities  to  study  these  im- 
pacts,  From  the  host  of analyses,  some gen- 
eralizable  findings  emerge.  Blattberg  and 
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findings,  with  respect  to  the  time  frame  of 
promotional  effects. Their  contribution  deals 
with  sales  promotion  effects  in  general,  but 
since  most  of  their  generalizations  equally 
apply  to  temporary  price  cuts,  we  take  up 
some points  of their  analysis  and supplement 
them  with  more  recent  findings.  In  the  dis- 
cussion  presented  here,  we  distinguish  be- 
tween  immediate  effects  of  a  price  cut,  and 
longer  term  effects. 
Immediate  effects  of  sales promotions.  For 
the  immediate  effects  of  price  promotions, 
there  is  much  unanimity  in  the  literature: 
sales  promotions,  and  price  promotions  in 
particular,  create  a  dramatic  boost  in  the 
sales  of  a brand.  Promotional  price  elastici- 
ties tend to be much larger  (in absolute  value) 
than  regular  elasticities.  Bolton  (1989)  re- 
ports  an  average  promotional  elasticity  of 
-2.45,  compared  to the  overall  (regular  and 
promotional)  average  price  elasticity  level of 
-  1.76 found by Tellis (1988b). Bemmaor  and 
Mouchoux  (1991) obtain  elasticities  between 
-2  and  -  11 for unadvertised  deals  of non- 
perishable  products.  Deal  elasticities  are  cer- 
tainly  more  pronounced  than  immediate  ad- 
vertising  effects (e.g.  Sethuraman  and  Tellis, 
1991; Tellis,  1988). 
A  large  portion  of  the  observed  sales  in- 
crease  stems  from  brand  switching (Gupta, 
1988; Walters,  1991). The  product  class sales 
impact  of  sales  promotion  may  exist  (Bem- 
maor  and  Mouchoux,  1991), but  is generally 
low. If an effect is observed,  it is often  caused 
by sales  displacement  (e.g.  purchase  acceler- 
ation, or purchase  postponement  when a deal 
is  anticipated).  An  interesting  finding  con- 
cerns  the  asymmetry of switching effects.  Re- 
cent  contributions  provide  evidence  that 
dominant,  manufacturer,  higher  priced  and 
often  higher  quality  brands  attract  a  large 
portion  of  other  brands’  buyers  during  pro- 
motional  periods,  but  that  the  reverse  is not 
true.  This  offers  interesting  opportunities  for 
such  brands  to  develop  a  price  strategy  to 
exploit  their  competitive  position  (Bemmaor 
and  Mouchoux,  1991;  Walters,  1991;  Ka- 
makura  and  Russell,  1989).  Finally,  an  im- 
portant  issue  mentioned  by  Blattberg  and 
Neslin (1989) is the  interaction between  price 
promotions  and  other  marketing  mix  vari- 
ables. Experimental  studies  show a consider- 
able  increase  in  the  impact  of  price  cuts 
when supported  by point  of purchase  promo- 
tion (Inman  et  al., 1990), or  advertising.  In  a 
study  of  frequently  purchased  goods,  Bem- 
maor  and  Mouchoux  (1991) found  price  deal 
elasticities  to  increase  from  20%  to  180% 
when the  deal was advertised.  Also, the form 
of the  advertisement  or  display  is important: 
presenting  advertised  prices  as  a  reduction 
from  regular  prices  seems  to  increase  the 
impact  of the  discount  (Cox and  Cox, 1990). 
Our  discussion  in  Section  3  already  sug- 
gested  the  importance  of  such  interactions; 
due  to  the  complexity  of many  buying  situa- 
tions,  the  proliferation  of  sales  promotion 
offers,  and  the  lack  of  price  knowledge  on 
the  part  of the  consumers. 
What happens in the long run?  Though  im- 
mediate  brand  sales effects  of promotion  are 
clearly  positive,  countervailing  forces may be 
at work in the  long run.  On the  positive side, 
there  is  the  possibility  of  enhancing  repeat 
sales  of  the  product,  and  of  building con- 
sumer franchise.  The  evidence  for  such posi- 
tive  impacts  is  fairly  limited.  According  to 
Jones (19901, temporary  price  reductions  and 
coupons have the weakest (positive) long term 
effects  of  all  below-the-line  activities,  since 
they  tend  to  appeal  to  “rational”  (financial) 
arguments  rather  than  build brand  franchise. 
Another  possible  long term  promotion  ef- 
fect  lies  in  stockpiling  or  purchase  accelera- 
tion. “Sales  displacement”  effects occur when 
consumers  build  up  inventories  of  the  pro- 
moted  product  to take  advantage  of the tem- 
porarily  lowered  price.  Evidence  on this phe- 
nomenon  is mixed: some authors  have identi- 
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Meyer  and  Assunsao,  1990;  Grover  and 
Srinivasan,  1992), whereas  other  studies  (e.g. 
Achabal  et al.,  1990; Moriarty,  193,“)  find  no 
evidence.  Traditionally,  sales  displacement 
has been viewed as undesirable  (except where 
firms  try  to  eliminate  stocks,  or  to  preempt 
the  market  in  the  face  of  competitive  ac- 
tions).  Indeed,  purchase  acceleration  consists 
of  “borrowing”  regular  price  sales  from  the 
future,  or  from  the  past  if  the  deal  was 
expected  by consumers.  But  recent  research 
suggests  that  sales  displacement  may  in- 
crease  profitability,  since  it sometimes  leads 
to an increase  in overall  consumption. 
Finally,  several  authors  (e.g.  Fader  and 
McAlister,  1988) suggest  that  price  promo- 
tions  have a negative  impact (over and  above 
inventory  effects)  on  subsequent  sales  for 
past  users  of the  brand.  Price  cuts may (this 
is not  always the case, e.g. Davis et al., 1992) 
reduce  the  consumers’  Mtillingness  to buy  the 
product  at  the  regular  price,  and  eventually 
damage  product  image.  Several  theories  are 
put  forward  to support  this: (i) the Reference 
Price  Theory  (frequent  promotions  lower the 
reference  price  of  consumers),  (ii)  Self  Per- 
ception  Theory  (consumers  having bought  on 
deal  attribute  some  of  the  product’s  attrac- 
tiveness  to  the  presence  of  the  deal  itself), 
and (iii) the  Price-Quality  Inference  Theory, 
referring  to an association  between  price and 
quality  in the consumer’s  mind. 
Negative  impacts  may jeopardize  the  prof- 
itability  of  many  price  degls.  According  to 
Hardy  (1986),  50%  of  promotional  actions 
would  be  unprofitable.  Jones  (1990)  con- 
cludes that,  given their  “disastrous  short term 
and  long  term  costs”,  price  promotions 
should  not be used hastily by managers  inter- 
ested  in profit. 
Factors  affecting  the  impact of price promo- 
tions.  So  far,  the  discussion  concentrated 
on  price  promotion  effects  in general,  where 
divergent  and  somctimcs  inconsistent  find- 
ings emerge.  The  recent  literature  attempts 
to explain the  divergent evidence.  Interesting 
findings are  summarized  below. 6 
First,  promotional  effects  vary  widely 
across consumer  segments.  Consumers’ reac- 
tions  to  promotions  are  strongly  affected  by 
differences  in  brand  switching  patterns,  in 
price  versus  quality  sensitivity,  in time  hori- 
zon,  in  level-of-price  (promotion)  informa- 
tion  processing  and,  closely  related,  in level 
of search  and  transaction  costs. 
Second, the level of promotional  activity in 
the  product  class  is  an  important  determi- 
nant of consumer  response.  Frequent  promo- 
tions  seem  to  reduce  the  immediate  sales 
effect.  The  timing of the  promotions  is also 
important:  promotions  that  occur  regularly, 
and/or  fit  the  purchasing  pattern  of (loyal) 
consumers,  have a less positive overall effect. 
Deep  and  frequent  price  discounts  further 
tend  to have a stronger  downward impact on 
reference  prices  and on future  willingness to 
PaYe 
Third,  promotional  price  elasticities  vary 
widely with product  type. Litvack et al. (1985) 
find the promotional  price impact to be larger 
for “stock up” than for “non-stock  up” goods. 
It  is obvious  that  purchase  acceleration  will 
be lower for bulky or perishable  goods, or for 
products  with  “high”  storage  costs  such  as 
frozen  food.  Producr  class  sales  effects  (in- 
creased  consumption)  will of course be lower 
for “necessary”  products.  Differences  in con- 
sumer  tastes  or  the  importance  attached  to 
prices, and the degree of product  differentia- 
tion  may  affect  both  immediate  and  long 
term  effects. 
All  these  factors  seem  to  interact  in  a 
complex way (see, e.g., Kahn and Raju, 1991). 
An  important  reason  for  our  lack of under- 
standing  of  promotional  effects  stems  from 
h  For  more  specific  information,  see  Narasimhan  (1984). 
Bolton  (1989t.1).  Kahn  and  Louie  (1990).  Blattkrs  and  wis- 
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the fact that  most “evidence”  is simply based 
on  empirical  research.  AS  Bemmaor  and 
Mouchoux  (1991) point  out:  “A  major  short- 
coming  of  most  promotion  analyses  is  that 
they  essentially  consist  of  postulating  and 
estimating  an  ad  hoc  (aggregate)  demand 
function  with  no  explicit  behavioral  founda- 
tion.  More  analysis must  be  done  on individ- 
ual  behavior  as  it  relates  to  promotion”. 
Some  recent  articles  have  tried  to  identify 
the  behavioral  underpinnings  of  price  pro- 
motion  activities. 
61.2  Behavioral models and price promotions 
Recently,  a  number  of  “formal”  models 
have  dealt  with the  effects  and  optimal&y  of 
price  promotions.  These  models  differ  in 
their  assumptions  concerning  the  time  hori- 
zon  of  consumers,  the  presence  of  product 
heterogeneity  in the  market,  the  distribution 
of  preferences,  of  search,  transaction,  and 
inventory  holding costs across consumers,  the 
level  of  information  available  to  consumers, 
and  the  type  of  competitive  interactions.  A 
schematic  overview  is given  in Table  2. The 
models  bring  forward  various  factors  that 
may justify  the use of promotional  actions,  as 
discussed  below. 
Preference  heterogeneity  among  consumers. 
Some  models  study  the  impact  of  brand !oy- 
alty on  optimal  prices  and  price  promotions. 
La1 (19901,  Narasimhan  (1988),  Raju  et  al. 
(1990),  and  Rao  (1991)  analyze  equilibrium 
pricing  strategies  of  firms  in  an  oligopoly, 
where  different  competitors  enjoy higher (e.g. 
national  brands)  or lower (e.g. private  labels) 
levels  of  brand  loyalty.  Consumers  may  ei- 
ther  exhibit  preferences  for  specific  brands 
(be  willing  to  pay  a  premium),  or  have  the 
“status”  of  a  brand  switcher  (purchase  pri- 
marily  based  on price).  Under  these  circum- 
stances,  it is found  that  the  use of (alternat- 
ing) price  promotions  can  be  a  non-cooper- 
ative  profit  maximizing equilibrium  strategy. 
While  there  arc  some  diffcrcnccs  between 
these  models  (Gijsbrechts,  19921, they  share 
a common  feature:  they  view promotions  as 
“defensive  strategies”  that  exploit preference 
heterogeneity  among  consumers,  and  as  a 
means  to compete  for the  switching segment. 
Their  assumptions  on  consumer  behavior 
are  inspired  and  supported  by  the  work  of 
Blattberg  and  Wisniewski  (1989). These  au- 
thors  postulate  a “price  tier”  model  of con- 
sumer  behavior.  Consumers  are  utility  maxi- 
mizers  in  a  given  product  class;  the  utility 
derived  from  different  products  depends  on 
two  attributes:  price  and  product  quality. 
Consumers  face  brands  with  varying  prices 
and  perceived  quality  levels,  and  make  a 
choice  consistent  with  the  relative  impor- 
tance  attached  to  both  attributes.  Blattberg 
and  Wisniewski  show  that  the  pattern  of 
brand  competition  in  such  a  market  is  a 
function  of  the  distribution  of  preferences 
(relative  importance  of  price  and  quality) 
across  consumers.  They  argue  that  under 
specific  conditions,  asymmetric  price  promo- 
tion  effects  are  observed:  promoting  brands 
attract  buyers  from products  in the same tier 
and below, but not from a higher  level brand. 
This  offers  an  interesting  explanation  for 
asymmetric  switching  effects  observed  in 
many  markets  (e.g.  Kamakura  and  Russell, 
1989). 
In  a  recent  contribution,  Kahn  and  Raju 
(1991)  further  distinguish  between  variety 
seeking  consumers  (whose  purchase  proba- 
bility for a brand  tends  to be reduced  when it 
was  bought  on  the  last  purchase  occasion), 
and  consumers  exhibiting  reinforcement  be- 
havior  (for  whom  the  opposite  holds):  this 
introduces  the  time  dimension  in consumer 
brand  choices.  The  authors  further  explore 
asymmetric  promotion  effects,  and  find  that 
whether  promotions  for  major  or  minor 
brands  are  more  successful  depends  on  the 
type  of  consumer  considered  (e.g.  variety 
seeking or  reinforcement). 
Ail  the  approaches  discussed  so  far  ex- 
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differences  in  consumer  preference  and 
brand  loyalty,  combined  with  anticipated 
competitive  actions.  Following  the distinction 
introduced  by Krishnamurthi  and Raj (WW, 
they  concentrate  on  the  choice  aspect  of 
purchases  and  disregard  the  quantity  deci- 
sion.  They  do  not  take  into  account  long 
term  effects  such as stockpiling,  product  class 
sales  effects  or  reduced  willingness  to  buy 
the  ploduct  at full cost over  time. 
A  different  line  of  models  considers  the 
implications  of  dynamic  decision  making  by 
the  consumer  (multiperiod  planning),  for the 
overall  sales promotion  effect. 
The impact of multiperiod planning.  Jeuland 
and  Narasimhan  (1985)  show  that  for  prod- 
ucts with  a high positive  correlation  between 
consumer  demand  rates  and  inventory  hold- 
ing  costs,  temporary  price  cuts  can  be  an 
effective  mechanism  to  discriminate between 
buyers with high and low inventory costs. Con- 
sumer  demand  in their  model  is determined 
by  regular  Frice,  magnitude  of  the  deal  (if 
one  is offered  in the  period  considered)  and 
the  cost of holding  inventory. 
Some  recent  contributions  use  Reference 
Price Theory,  and assume  the consumer  takes 
into  account  expectations about future  prices 
in forming  internal  standards.  Assungao  and 
Meyer  (1990) develop  a  normative  theory  of 
sequential  buying  and  consumption,  under 
uncertainty  about  future  market  prices.  They 
show  that  for  rational  consumers,  increases 
in the  relative  frequency  of  promotions  lead 
to  higher  overall  consumption,  and  to  lower 
contemporaneous  price  elasticities.  They 
provide  a  rationale  for  price  promotions 
ooking  at  consumers  who  maximize  utility. 
Meyer  and  Assunc;ao  (1990)  use  a  similar 
model  as  a benchmark  for  the  evaluation  of 
buyer  behavior  in  an  experimental  setting. 
They  conclude  that  subjects  do  not  behave 
optimally  when  confronted  with  bimo&l 
price  distributions  (on-deal  and  off-deal 
prices),  but  tend  to  USC  simpler  heuristics. 
But  this  does  not  jeopardize  the  potential 
profitability  of  price  deals;  on  the  contrary: 
the  authors  find  that  subjects  consistently 
overbuy  in the  face of price  promotions. 
Differences  in price  information  (processing) 
and  transaction costs.  The  previous  models 
argue  that  multiperiod  planning  on  the  part 
of  the  consumer  might  lead  promotions  to 
increase  overall  sales  levels,  at  least  in  the 
monopoly  case. Krishna  et al. (1991) develop 
a conceptual  model  reflecting  the  impact  of 
expected  prices  and  deals  on  purchase  be- 
havior.  Unlike  the  approaches  just  men- 
tioned,  they  consider  a  competitive  setting, 
and  allow consumers  to  have different  levels 
of price  information.  They  provide  empirical 
evidence  that  some  consumers  are  knowl- 
edgeable  about  (expected)  promotions  and 
adapt  their  pattern  of purchases  accordingly. 
This  might  result  in lower  profits  for  manu- 
facturers,  at  least  if  knowledgeable  con- 
sumers  would  be  willing  to  purchase  the 
product  at  full  price.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  a  considerable  segment  of  less  in- 
formed  consumers  (younger  buyers,  with 
smaller  family  sizes, who  purchase  the  item 
less  frequently)  who  do  not  exhibit  deal  to 
deal buying behavior,  and  might be attracted 
by promotional  signals  accompanied  by only 
small  (or  even  zero)  price  cuts.  Managers 
should,  however,  be  careful  with  “unjusti- 
fied”  promotional  signaling  since  this  may 
trigger  word  of mouth  from  informed  to  un- 
informed  consumers.  7 
The  article  of Krishna  et  al.  supports  the 
view given by Tellis (1986), that  price promo- 
tions  may be  an effective  means  of  discrimi- 
nating between informed and uninformed con- 
’  The  extent  to  which  managers  wish  to  engage  in  “justified” 
promotional  signailing  (e.g.  drawing  attention  to  real  price 
cuts  through  advertising  or  display)  depends  on  the  objec- 
tivc  pursued  (Dickson  and  Sawyer,  1990).  If  the  promotion 
is  intended  to  discriminate  between  informed  and  unin- 
formed  consumers,  it  is  not  ncccssary  or  even  desirable  to 
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sumers.  In  a dynamic  setting,  granting  price 
deals  at “random”  points  in time may reduce 
deal  to  deal  buying  by  informed  consumers, 
and  may  avoid  learning  by  consumers  with 
high search costs (and little price knowledge). 
Gerstner  and  Holthausen  (1986) examine 
the  impact  of  transaction  costs on  the  opti- 
mality  of price differentiation.  They  consider 
the  case  of  a  monopolist  selling  a  homoge- 
neous  product  in  two  markets  that  are  not 
perfectly  isolated.  Consumers  have heteroge- 
aeous  transaction  costs  of buying  in the  low 
price  market.  They  find  that,  even if the  two 
market  segments  are  not perfectly  isolated,  a 
differential  price strategy  can be profitable  if 
consumers  with  high  transaction  costs  also 
have  high  reservation  prices.  The  price  dif- 
ferentiation  strategy  analysed  here  is not  re- 
ally “promotional”  in the sense that  the price 
cut  need  not be temporary.  8 However,  some 
authors  have  found  similarities  with  the  ef- 
fect  of  coupon  promotions,  which  can  func- 
tion  as  a price  discriminaLion mechanism  in 
the  presence  of  heterogeneous  transaction 
costs (see  also Narasimhar,  1984). 
The  models  discussed  here  provide  inter- 
esting  insights  into  the  “economic”  founda- 
tions  for  sales promotions.  They  support  the 
ideas  put  forward  by  Tellis,  showing  that 
consumer  heterogeneity  is often  the  key to a 
profitable  promotion  strategy,  but  also  ex- 
tend  them  by more  explicitly considering  the 
interplay  with  dynamics  in  consumer  deci- 
sions,  and  with  competitive  interactions. 
What  they  clearly  show  is  that  promotions 
can  be  profitable  in  a  variety  of  situations, 
and  for  a variety  of reasons.  But each  model 
remains  partial,  while considering  more  real- 
istic situations  will make  it difficult  to obtain 
analytical  solutions.  One  aspect  completely 
disregarded  by  all models  is the  crucial  role 
of  middlemen  in  the  promotional  pricing 
strategy. 
n  Actually,  it  is  similar  to  the  Sectd  Market  Discounting 
strategy  in  Tellis’s  intcgrativc  scheme. 
6.2  Interactions  between  manufacturers  and 
retailers 
Many  of the  previous  models  assume that 
the  manufacturer  is able  to  determine  con- 
sumer  prices.  Since there  has  been  a  major 
shift in control  from manufacturer  to retailer 
or  distributor,  McGoldrick  (1986) points  out 
that  “In  most (European)  countries,  the  ma- 
jor  responsibility  for the  setting  of fast mov- 
ing consumer  goods prices  is increasingly  in 
the  hands  of large retail  chains. The  decline 
of  Resale  Price  Maintenance  (RPM),  fol- 
lowed by the  progressive  growth in the  scale 
and  sophistication  of the  major  chain retail- 
ers,  are  amongst  the  factors  that  have com- 
bined  to bring about this shift of power from 
the  manufacturers”.  The  decline  of  RPM 
(the  possibility  for  the  manufacturer  to  set 
prices  at  the  retail  level),  is  further  com- 
mented  upon  by  Sheffet  and  Scammon 
(1985), who point out  that  RPM has become 
legally  risky,  and  that  manufacturers  should 
avoid “written”  price binding contracts. 
RPM  reflects  a  manufacturer’s  desire  to 
specify minimum retail  prices. In the context 
of price  promotions,  however, the problem  is 
the opposite.  Manufacturers  have a hard time 
getting  distributors  to “accept”  their  promo- 
tional  deals.  The  reasons  may  be  the  huge 
number  of deal offers received by the retailer 
(who  has  perhaps  built  up  inventories  of 
competitive  products),  the  limited  space 
availability  in the  shop  (restricting  the  room 
for  accompanying  displays),  and  the  fear  of 
retailers  that  promotions  may  harm  overall 
store  profitability.  Moreover,  if a deal  is ac- 
cepted,  it is often only “partly”  passed on to 
the  consumer. 
Two implications can be derived from this. 
First,  in  planning  consumer  promotions, 
manufacturers  must  anticipate  retailer  reac- 
tions.  This  opens  up  an  interesting  line  of 
research,  in which contributions  only emerge 
now.  Models incorporating  manufacturer-re- 
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and  Gijsbrechts  (1990)  look  at  the  manufac- 
turer’s  product  line  pricing  problem,  assum- 
ing that  retailers  react  to  price  changes  with 
an  adjustment  in allocated  shelf  space.  Bul- 
tez and  Leruth  (1989) investigate  the  impact 
of  asymmetric  information  concerning  retail 
costs, on optimal  wholesale  and  retail  prices. 
Jeuland  and  Shugan  (1988)  analyze  the  im- 
pact  of  rational  conjectures  (expected  reac- 
tions)  in a vertical  channel  on  price/margin 
decisions,  and channel  profit. 
A  very  interesting  model  is developed  by 
Sethuraman  and Tellis  (1991). They  consider 
a  single  brand  manufacturer  who  looks  for 
the  profit  maximizing  levels  of  advertising 
and  trade  prices,  taking  into  account  the 
reaction  of distributors-who  pass on  to  the 
consumer  only a fraction  of the  discount-as 
well as  the  opportunity  cost  due  to  reduced 
margins.  The  model  remains  rather  simple, 
but  it sets  the  scene  for  exciting  research.  It 
treats  deal  acceptance  and  pass-through  as 
largely  exogenous,  whereas  in practice  these 
elements  are  influenced  by manufacturer  de- 
cisions. 
This  leads  us  to  our  second  point,  that 
manufacturers  (and  researchers)  should  pay 
more  attention  to  factors  affecting  deal  ac- 
ceptance  by the  trade.  This  does  not  imply a 
need  for  higher  budgets  (from  an  empirical 
analysis,  Abraham  and  Lodish  (1990)  con- 
clude  that  only  16%  of  trade  deals  is prof- 
itable!).  But, manufacturers  should plan  their 
trade  deals more carefully  to fit the need  and 
competitive  strategy  of large  retail  customers 
U-Jar@y,  1986). This  calls  for  an  appropriate 
selection  of the type  of products  to promote, 
and  of the  timing,  frequency  and  magnitude 
of  promotions  offered.  Empirical  research 
suggests that  it is better  to offer  fewer deals, 
but each  with larger  incentives  (Hardy,  1986; 
Blattberg  and  Wisniewski,  1989). The  “Pro- 
motor”  expert  system developed  by Abraham 
and  Lodish  (1987) represents  an  interesting 
tool to assist  manufacturers  in planning  their 
trade  deals. 
The  bottom  line  of  this  discussion  is that 
more  insight  is  needed  into  the  store  level 
impact  of price  discounts,  since  such knowl- 
edge  is beneficial  to  both  manufacturers  (in 
convincing  distributors)  and  retailers.  As 
Walters  (1991) puts  it: “Because  most retail- 
ers  underutilize  their  scanner  data,  docu- 
menting  the  effectiveness  of  price  promo- 
tions  may  enhance  retail  promotional  sup- 
port  of  manufacturer  trade  deals  and  ulti- 
mately  improve  promotional  performance  of 
manufacturers  and  retailers”. 
Before  embarking  on  the  issue  of  retail 
effectiveness  of price promotions,  it is impor- 
tant  to  note  that,  though  only  promotional 
pricing schemes  are discussed  in this section, 
other  pricing  strategies  must  be  considered 
in  the  manufacturer-retailer  coordination 
problem.  The  use  of  price/quantity  dis- 
counts,  for instance,  is often  mentioned  as an 
effective  tool  for  obtaining  channel  effi- 
ciency, and will be treated  in Section  7. 
6.3  Issues in the impact of price promotion for 
retailers 
From  the  previous  section,  it is clear  that 
the retailer  has recently  come  to play a more 
vital role  in the  promotional  arena.  The  bulk 
of promotional  price cuts are still initiated  by 
the  manufacturers.  For  these  activities,  the 
retailer  has to decide on deal  acceptance  and 
on  the  extent  of  pass-through.  But  retailers 
(especially  in  larger  department  stores, 
Achabal  et  al.,  1990) increasingly  engage  in 
promotional  activities  of  their  own (e.g.  for 
private  labels),  for which they  have complete 
control  over  the  features,  timing  and  dura- 
tion. ’ Since  the  recent  pricing  contributions 
concentrate  on promotional  actions,  we limit 
our  discussion  to those  issues. 
”  In  this  section.  WC’  arc  mainly  intercstcd  in  promotional 
pricing  strategies  at  the  retail  Icvcl.  It  is  clear  that  other 
issues  arc  involved  in  retail  pricing;  an  ovcrviuw  is  given  in 
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The  ultimate  goal  of  these  actions  is  the 
improvement  of  store  performance.  Hence, 
the  scope  of  the  investigation  in  the  price 
promotion  literature  has  been  expanded  to 
include  the  impact  of  deals  on  several 
storewide  outcome  variables.  Indeed,  it  is 
important  to  recognize  that,  on  top  of  the 
promotional  effects mentioned  in Section 6.1, 
the  retailer  is  confronted  with  additional 
consequences,  both  in the  short  and the  long 
run. 
6.3.1 Short term effects of retail promotions 
In the short  run, the retailer  will be partic- 
ularly  interested  in  the  following  impact  of 
promotional  activities: 
l Substitution  effects within the product  class. 
These  are  also  of  interest  to  the  manufac- 
turer,  who  finds  brand  switching  an  impor- 
tant  source  of  extra  sales.  For  the  retailer, 
however,  substitution  has  different  implica- 
tions  as  it  represents  cannibalization  within 
his  assortment.  The  reluctance  of  retailers 
towards  price promotions  stems from the fear 
that  sales  of  promoted  products  at  smaller 
margins  will be  traded  for  full  margin  sales 
of unpromoted  items,  lo as indicated  by many 
studies  of retail  promotions  revealing  strong 
substitution  effects  within  product  classes 
(Bemmaor  and  Mouchoux,  1991;  Walters, 
1988, 1989). Moreover,  switching effects  are 
asymmetric:  store owned brands  are less able 
to  attract  buyers  from  national  brands  than 
vice versa. 
l Complementarity  effects  and  additional 
sales  of  unrelated  items.  Conventional  wis- 
dom  suggests  that  promotions  may  have  a 
positive  impact  on  sales  of  complementary 
items,  and could positively affect within-store 
sales  of  unrelated  items.  Evidence  from  the 
literature  is mixed.  Some  studies  reveal  sig- 
IO  Of  course,  such  cannibalization  also  exists  for  manufactur- 
ers  offering  a  full  line  of  products.  In  fact,  the  promotional 
effects  for  retailers  and  multiproduct  m;rnufacturers  are 
quite  comparable  in  several  respects. 
nificant  complementarity  effects  (e.g.  \;V& 
ters,  1988, 1991), but find them  to be smaller 
than  substitution  impacts. The  impact  on  WI- 
related  merchandise  will  probably  increase 
with the  transaction  costs of consumers,  and 
strongly  depend  on the  competitive  situation 
(and  layout?)  of  the  store.  Little  empirical 
evidence  on  this  phenomenon  is  available 
(for  some  results,  see  Walters,  1988, 1991; 
and Walters  and McKenzie,  1988). 
l Increased  store trafic.  Some  contributions 
emphasize  the  ability  to  attract  new  cus- 
tomers  to  the  store  (build  store  traffic)  as a 
crucial  determinant  of the  promotion’s  prof- 
itability  (Walters,  1988; Walters  and McKen- 
zie,  1988; Mulhern  and  Leone,  1990). The 
(short  run)  traffic  building  capacity  of price 
cuts  is, of  course,  conditional  upon  the  an- 
nouncement  of the deal  outside  of the store. 
Available  evidence  is  still  inconclusive, 
though  interstore  brand  substitution  effects 
seem  to  be  limited.  This  may  be  related  to 
the fact that  many customers  have poor price 
recall  (see  above),  which  does  not  prevent 
point-of-sale  price  comparisons  among 
brands,  but  hampers  interstore  comparisons 
(Cox and Cox, 1990). We expect the ability to 
attract  new  customers  to  vary  widely  with 
promotion  type, product  class, marketing mix 
support,  and  competitive  situation  of  the 
store. 
The  net  effect of the  previous  phenomena 
on  store  profitability  is  not  invariably  posi- 
tive.  However,  this  must  be  supplemented 
with long run  implications. 
6.3.2 Retail promotions from  a long term per- 
spective 
In the  long run, retail  promotions  may be 
useful  in creating  barriers to entry (Walters, 
1988),  and  increasing  store  competitiveness. 
The  latter  is closely  related  to  promotional 
effects  on  the  store’s  price  image.  AS  in&- 
catz6  hy  Cox  and  Cox  (1990),  consumers 
often  patronize  stores  based  on  perc&:ptions 
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image becomes  an important  competitive  tool 
for retailers,  not only  in the  packaged  goods 
sector,  but  also for durables. 
Fairly  little  is known  about  how price  im- 
ages  are  formed.  A number  of recent  articles 
(e.g.  Tellis,  1987; Cox  and  COX, 1990;  MC- 
Goldrick  and  Marks,  1985; Buyukkurt,  1986; 
Feichtinger  et  al.,  1988) provide  fragmented 
insights  on  this  issue.  They  point  out  that, 
before  visiting the store,  consumers  often  use 
nonprice  store  attributes  as  cues  in  image 
formation;  in  particular  characteristics  such 
as  product  assortment,  service,  opening 
hours,  interior.  Retail  advertisements  may 
also  be  important  sources  of  information. 
During  shopping  trips,  consumers  may  se- 
quentially  learn  about  prices,  and  update 
their  image.  Preliminary  research  suggests, 
however,  that  consumers’  first  impressions 
are  very  important,  and  tend  to persist  even 
after  exposure  to  subsequent  (sometimes 
contradictory)  information.  This could be due 
to  the  complexity  of  the  price  structure  at 
the  retail  level,  the  presence  of  many  dis- 
tracting  factors,  and  the  speed  with  which 
the  shopping  task  must  often  be  performed. 
For  the  same  reasons,  some  authors  specu- 
late  that,  in  forming  or  adjusting  price  im- 
ages, consumers  will focus on a few products 
as exemplars  of the  store’s  total  price  offer- 
ing.  This  proposition  is  consistent  with  the 
practice  of  supermarkets,  which  often  iden- 
tify a small number  of key products  on which 
they want  to be price  competitive,  to support 
a low price  image. 
These  observations  have  important  man- 
agerial  implications.  First,  retailers  should  be 
very  attentive  to  the  price  information  pro- 
vided  in  their  advertisements,  since  “sticky” 
price  images  are  derived  from  them,  In view 
of  the  low  price  knowledge  typical  of  many 
consumers,  they  may  find  it  profitable  to 
announce  deals as reductions  of a given regu- 
lar  price.  Biswas  and  Blair  ( 1991)  suggest 
that  such  reference  price  advertising  will be 
relatively  more  effective  for  discount  stores, 
and  that  stores  may find  it  profitable  to  use 
“less  plausible”  reference  prices  rather  than 
plausible  ones,  even  though  the  former  are 
“discounted”  more  heavily  in  the  consumer 
evaluation  process. 
Second,  if they want to “adjust”  their  store 
image,  they  should  make  sure  to  also  adapt 
store  attributes  correlated  with price. 
Finally,  if a “price  exemplar”  effect exists, 
the  question  remains  what  products  the  con- 
sumer  uses  to  form  store  images.  Though 
some  authors  recognize  this  as an important 
issue, very  little  is known about  it at present. 
Feichtinger  et al. (1988) model  the  impact 
of price  and advertising  on retailer  profit  in a 
convenience  goods setting. The effect of store 
prices is twofold. First, prices  affect the num- 
ber  of  units  bought  by  consumers  presently 
visiting  the  shop.  Second,  in  the  long  run, 
observed  prices  alter  the  store’s  price  image, 
with an influence  on store  traffic.  Store price 
image  is  modeled  as  a  weighted  adaptive 
learning  process,  where  individual  products 
have  varying  levels  of  impact.  Under  these 
conditions,  Feichtinger  et al. derive price and 
advertising  policies  that  maximize  long  run 
retailer  profit.  Their  analysis  is based  on  a 
number  of  simplifying  assumptions  (e.g.  no 
competition,  fixed reservation  prices for indi- 
vidual  products),  and  does  not  empirically 
validate  the  model. 
In  summary,  the  impact  of  price  promo- 
tions  on store  performance  is a multifaceted 
and  “tricky”  issue.  There  is  concern,  and 
some evidence,  that  many  retail  promotional 
activities  are  not profitable  at the  store  level. 
But  it  is difficult  to identify  and  disentangle 
the  effects  empirically  (see  also  Section  9). 
Given  the  importance  of  “traffic  building”, 
more  insight  might be gained  from studies  of 
the  role  of  prices  in store  patronage  behav- 
ior. 
Many  of the  problems  in evaluating  retail 
promotions  stem  from  the  fact  that  retailer 
pricing  is  “multiproduct”  pricing,  an  area 
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% Multiproduct  pricing  %1 Optimal item prices  in  a  line  of  substitute 
products 
Though  many  pricing  decisions  take  place 
in a multiproduct  context,  product  line  pric- 
ing has received  less attention  in the market- 
ing literature.  While  in recent  years,  a num- 
ber  of contributions  deal  with this topic  in a 
more  systematic  way, the  issue of multiprod- 
uct  pricing  has  not  gained  the  attention  it 
deserves. 
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Interdependencies  between  products  in  a 
line  can  greatly  influence  the  consumer’s 
evaluation  of  prices  and  items.  This  is con- 
firmed  by  recent  experimental  work.  Pet- 
roshius  and  Monroe  (1987) show that  price 
characteristics  of  the  product  line  interact. 
The  consumer’s  evaluation  of  a  particular 
model  in the line will depend  on the range  of 
prices  offered,  on  the  acceptability  of  the 
highest  price,  and  on  the  price  position  of 
the  model  in the  line.  The  impact  of  “rela- 
tive”  price  position  in  a choice  set  has  also 
been  demonstrated  by  Huber  et  al.  (1986), 
who  find  that  bracketing  (adding  a superior 
(inferior)  item  to  the  choice  set  so  that  the 
originally  considered  brand  is  no  longer  at 
the  boundary  of  the  price-quality  contin- 
uum)  increases  price  sensitivity. 
Carpenter  and  Hanssens  (1987)  identify 
two research  streams  in Marketing/Manage- 
ment  Science  on  product  line  pricing:  (i) 
approaches  that  measure  market  response, 
and  then  simply  compute  optimal  product 
line  prices,  and  (ii)  economic  models,  that 
provide  fragmented  theoretical  insight  into 
multiproduct  price  discrimination  and  quan- 
tity  discount  strategies.  Some  models  have 
since  appeared  that  can  be  situated  some- 
where  in  the  middle,  as  they  provide  both 
“generalizable”  guidelines  and empirical  evi- 
dence.  For  ease  of exposition,  we center  the 
discussion  around  the  following  topics:  (i) 
determining  item  prices  in  a  line  of  substi- 
tute  products,  (ii)  price  bundling,  (iii)  com- 
plementary  pricing,  and  (iv)  price/quantity 
discounts. 
Some recent  efforts  revisit the  problem  of 
profit  maximizing pricing for substitute  prod- 
ucts  in  an  assortment.  Carpenter  and 
Hanssens  (1987) extend the  Dorfman  Steiner 
theorem  for  a monopolist  marketing  a com- 
plete  line  of  products.  They  take  into  ac- 
count  both  cannibalization  and  market  ex- 
tension  effects,  and  consider  the  impact  of 
capacity  changes  on optimal  prices. The  au- 
thors  provide  an  application  to  the  Paris- 
Abidjan  air travel market. 
Bultez  et  al. (1991) consider  the  competi- 
tive pricing problem of a manufacturer  offer- 
ing a line of substitute  items.  Competition  is 
modeled  through  an asymmetric  MCI speci- 
fication,  and pricing rules are derived for two 
cases:  no  competitive  reaction,  and  optimal 
(profit  maximizing)  reaction.  The  model  is 
illustrated  with an application  in the Belgian 
coffee  market. 
Dobson  and  Kalish  (1988)  consider  the 
problem  of  product  line  design  and  pricing 
simultaneously.  Given a number  of consumer 
segments  with perfect  information  and vary- 
ing reservation  prices, and  in the  absence  of 
competitive  reaction,  they  formulate  the 
manufacturer’s  problem  of product  selection 
and  pricing.  Given  the  complexity  of  their 
problem,  solution heuristics are proposed and 
illustrated  on  simulated  problems.  Applica- 
tions  of  the  model  in  a  real  life setting  are 
discussed.  l1 
The previous models consider  lines of sub- 
stitute  products,  and  mainly  differ  in  their 
assumptions  on consumer  behavior, competi- 
tive  context,  and  decision  variables.  They 
II Other  models, such as the  Defender  Approach of Shugan. 
integrate  the  problems of  price  positioning and  compcti- 
tion.  Their  focus is not, however, on multiproduct  compa- 
nies.  As  indicated  by Moorthy  (1988).  the  effect  of  Price 
competition  between  firms,  and  cannibalizatiov  within  a 
company,  on  the  “best”  price-quality  strategy,  is  quite 
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provide  specific insights  into  the  role  of vari- 
ous factors  affecting  optimal  price levels (e.g. 
level of sales interdependence  within the line, 
type  of  competitive  reaction,  product  class 
sales  elasticity  with  respect  to  price,  individ- 
ual item  cost (differences),  and may form  the 
basis  for  “rules  of  thumb”  in  product  line 
pricing. 
Each  of  these  models  assumes  that  one 
price  level  has  to be  set  for  every  individual 
item  in the  line. 
7.2 Price bundling 
Another  possible  multiproduct  strategy  is 
that  of  price  bundling,  where  two  or  more 
products  are  marketed  in a single package  at 
a  special  price.  This  practice  is  mainly  for 
complementary  items,  and  its  use  seems  to 
have increased  in recent  years.  In his integra- 
tive  scheme,  Tellis  (1986)  suggested  that  a 
bundling  strategy  could  be  optimal  for  a 
product  line manufacturer  facing asymmetric 
demand.  Guiltinan  (1987)  provides  a  more 
extensive  framework  applied  to  bundling 
strategies  for services. 
Bundling  can  be  pure  (products  available 
only  bundled)  or  mixed  (products  can  be 
bought  individually  or bundled).  In the  latter 
case, Guiltinan  distinguishes  between  “mixed 
leader  bundling”  (one  product  is discounted 
when the other  is bought  at the regular  price), 
and  a “mixed joint  strategy”,  where  a single 
package  price  is set  when  the  products  are 
purchased  jointly.  The  objectives  of bundling 
are  cross-selling  (sell  the  bundle  to  cus- 
tomers  who  would  otherwise  buy  only  one 
product),  acquisition  of new customers  (who 
would buy none of the  products  individually), 
and/or  retention  (keep  customers  buying  all 
products).  Guiltinan  lists  the  price  and  de- 
mand  conditions  under  which  various 
bundling  programs  can  be  successful.  His 
analysis  is  conceptual,  and  considers  only 
two  services  in  a  product  line.  Hanson  and 
Martin  (1990)  provide  a  formal  model  to 
determine  both  the  optimal  product  line 
composition  and  (bundle)  pricing  for  a 
monopolist,  as  a  mixed  integer  linear  pro- 
gramming  problem.  A tractable  solution  pro- 
cedure  is  offered  for  the  case  where  the 
number  of possible  items in the  line becomes 
large, and  the  collection  of data  necessary  as 
model  inputs  is discussed.  Like the  model  of 
Dobson  and  Kalish, the  approach  of Hanson 
and  Martin  provides  an  interesting  formal 
treatment  of  a  complex  problem.  Both  ap- 
proaches  however  rely  on  some  simple  hy- 
potheses  concerning  consumer  behavior,  and 
disregard  competition.  The  inclusion of more 
realistic  conditions  could greatly  enhance  the 
computational  difficulty,  and  make analytical 
results  virtually  impossible. 
7.3 Complementary pricing 
The  complementary  pricing  problem  oc- 
curs when  a line of complementary  products 
is offered.  Some  products  may  be  sold  at  a 
loss, which  is made  up  for  by  the  profit  on 
complements  in the line. According  to Tellis, 
an economic  rationale  for this type of scheme 
is the presence  of transaction  costs for (some) 
products.  Where  store  visits  may  imply  time 
or financial  costs, this  strategy  is well known 
as  “loss  leadership”.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
some  empirical  work  has  addressed  the  im- 
pact of loss leader  and promotional  prices on 
store  performance,’  but  the  evidence  is  far 
from  conclll+e_  Fnrthermore,  the  theoreti- 
cal  foundations  for  this  strategy  have  not 
been  explored  in depth  in the  recent  rrarket- 
ing literature.  Hess and Gerstner  (1987) study 
the  effect  of  loss  leader  pricing  and  rain 
check  policy  ‘* on  stores’  profit  and  overall 
market  equilibria.  They  find  that,  under  cer- 
tain  conditions,  the use of leader  pricing and 
I2  When  a consumer finds that  the  loss leader  is out of stock 
during  his store visit, he receives a rain  check which  guar- 
antees that  he will  get the product  at the current  low price 
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rain  checks  can  increase  retailer  profit  ini- 
tially,  but  that  competitive  reactions  may  al- 
ter  the  effects  of such  a policy. Their  model 
is  interesting,  but  based  on  a  number  of 
simplifying  hypotheses.  Overall,  the  impact 
of  loss  leader  pricing  warrants  further  re- 
search. 
7.4 Price / quantity discounts 
A  topic  that  (re)gained  the  attention  of 
some marketing  scholars  is the use of  price/ 
quantity discounts (Gordon  et  al.,  1991). In 
some  sense,  price/quantity  discounts  are  re- 
lated  to  multiproduct  pricing,  insofar  as 
smaller  or  larger  quantities  of  the  same 
product  can  be  considered  as  different 
“ package  sizes”,  and  sometimes  the  volume 
required  to obtain  the  discount  is calculated 
over  different  products  (variants).  This  type 
of  strategy  is  not  explicitly  mentioned  by 
Tellis  (1986), but  shows some  similarities  to 
complementary  pricing  (two part  pricing),  or 
to  premium  pricing  (where  companies  offer- 
ing a line  of substitutes  take  a loss on  their 
lower  priced  product  versions,  and  make 
profits  on  their  higher  priced  items),  as dis- 
cussed  below. 
The  economic  rationale  behind  price/ 
quantity  discounts  is summarized  in  a  num- 
ber  of  recent  marketing  articles.  There  are 
different  reasons  why discount  schemes  may 
lead  to  seller  cost  reductions  or  increased 
profits.  They  may  serve  as  a  perfect  price 
discrimination  mechanism  in  a  market  with 
homogeneous  consumers  having  inventory 
carrying  and  transportation  costs  (Dolan, 
1987), when  the  demand  function  is  down- 
ward  sloping.  Opportunities  for partial  price 
discrimination  are  present  when  the  seller 
confronts  a  heterogeneous  market,  where 
heavy users or large quantity  buyers are more 
price  sensitive.  Third,  price/quantity  dis- 
counts  may lead  to improved  coordination  in 
channels  of distribution  through  their  impact 
on  purchase  timing  (Day  and  Ryans,  1988; 
Dolan,  1987; Wilcox et  al.,  1987). Some  au- 
thors  (Gordon  et  al.,  1991; Day  and  Ryans, 
1988; Dolan,  1987) consider discount schemes 
as  a  useful  way  of  exploiting  competitive 
position  (e.g. cost structure)  and of preempt- 
ing  the  market.  Using  Tellis’  terminology, 
quantity  discounts  may imply different  types 
of  shared  economies:  between  various  types 
of consumers  (through  different  price  sensi- 
tivity), between  channel  levels (the seller and 
buyer/retailer  share  cost  savings),  or  be- 
tween  products  (production  costs, economies 
of scale). 
Developing  a price/quantity  discount pro- 
gram  implies  decisions on (i) the  target  cus- 
tomers  (will  the  discount  be  offered  to  all 
consumers,  or to a select group only)? (ii) the 
form of the discount (price reduction  or non- 
price  stimulus)  (iii) the  coverage  of the  pro- 
gram,  or  the  qualifying  unit  base;  usually, 
discounts  are  offered  for  one  product  on  a 
single  purchase  occasion.  More  complex 
schemes,  in which units  are  cumulated  over 
different  products  and/or  transactions,  open 
up  new  strategic  opportunities  (Day  and 
Ryans,  1988) (iv) the discount  schedule; here, 
the  price  setter  determines  whether  the  dis- 
count  will apply  to  all  units  sold or  only  to 
units  above  a  minimum.  Next,  he  decides 
upon  the complexity of the scheme (the num- 
ber  of  break  points).  Finally,  the  depth  of 
discount  (magnitude  of the  price  cut)  is de- 
termined. 
A number  of models investigated the prof- 
it  (and  welfare)  implications  of  various 
schemes,  and  developed  guidelines  for  the 
construction  of  optimal  discount  schedules 
(e.g.,  Dolan,  1987). These  models  typically 
include  simplifying  assumptions,  e.g. buyers 
are  completely  informed  about  prices,  have 
no  bargaining  power,  and  base  their  deci- 
sions  on  the  Economic  Order  Quantity 
model;  competitive  factors,  and  the  possible 
development  of “gray”  markets,  are  ignored. 
Recent  contributions  recognize  that  the  in- 
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count  schedules,  but  indicate  that  their  im- 
pact  may be very complex  and  needs  further 
research,  especially  in competitive  settings. 
Concluding  this  section  on  product  line 
pricing,  it  is clear  that  multiproduct  pricing 
needs  further  attention.  The  recent  contribu- 
tions  form  an  interesting  starting  point  for 
further  research.  A problem  that  emerges  is 
that  contributions  to  date  offer  valuable  in- 
sights  for  specific  pricing  approaches  only, 
and  there  is  a  lack  of  integration  of  the 
different  strategies.  Real  life  situations  may 
call  for  a  mixture  of  multiproduct  pricing 
principles;  e.g. “complementary  pricing”  and 
“price  bundling”  may  be  used  simultane- 
ously  for  complementary  items.  An  addi- 
tional  complicating  factor  is that  the  distinc- 
tion  between  complementary  and  substitute 
characteristics  of  the  company’s  cost  struc- 
ture  vis-S-vis competitors  (fixed  vs  variable 
costs,  economies  of  scale  or  experience  ef- 
fects),  may  make  or  break  the  effect  of  a 
price/quantity  discount  strategy.  “Barriers 
to Resale”  (such as high  transaction  costs)  is 
another  element  brought  to  the  attention  of 
marketeers  (Day  and  Ryans,  1988;  Dolan, 
1987). Finally,  implementation  factors  should 
be  incorporated  into  the  pricing  decision, 
since they  may interfere  with  its profitability. 
Costs  of  communication  or  administration 
typically  increase  with  program  complexity, 
as  does  the  possible  negative  reaction  from 
salesmen  or  customers;  but  very  little  evi- 
dence  on these  issues is available  at present. 
In  summary,  recent  contributions  point  to 
the  strategic  opportunities  offered  by  dis- 
Table  3 
Characteristics  of  recent  new  product/dym  mic  pricing  models 
Kohil  and 
Mahajan 
(1991) 





Choi  et  al. 
(1990) 
Dhebar  and 
Oren 
(1985) 
Competitive  situation  multiple 
competitors 
monopoly  monopoly  differentiated  duopoly 
and  oligopoly 
monopoly 
Time  horizon 
Model  outcome 
short  term 
analysis 
optimal  price 
( + optimal 
product  concept) 
no 
multiple  periods  multiple  periods 
price  trajectory  price  trajectory 
short  term  analysis  multiple  periods 
optimal  price  and 
product  position 
of  new  product 
no 
price  trajectory 
Cost  dynamics 
Demand  specification 
no 
consumers 
maximize  inter- 
temporal  utility 
no  yes 
(exp.  curve) 
product 
attractiveness 
increases  with 
network  expansion 
(adoption) 
new  product  re- 
servation  price 
estimated  from 
conjoint  utility; 
demand  function 
incorporation 




product  choice  logit 
model,  function  of 
price  and  quality 
awareness 
diffusion  model  + 
adoption  model 
Reservation 
Transaction  costs 
Search  costs  and  info 
levels  on  price 
Quality 
uncertainty/risk 








awareness  f 








no  some  uncertainty 
on  network  growth 
no 
no 
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items  is not  always clear-cut.  Whether  prod- 
ucts  are  complements  or substitutes  may dif- 
fer  between  consumers,  and  depend  on  the 
“scope”  of  the  analysis.  In  deciding  on  ap- 
propriate  pricing strategies,  it matters  to rec- 
ognize the full complexity of product  interde- 
pendencies,  and  to judge  the  relative  impor- 
tance  of “countervailing”  (substitute  or com- 
plementary)  forces  in  the  light  of  the  com- 
pany’s pricing objectives. 
8.  Dynamic/new  product pricing 
In  the  context  of diffusion  models,  Blitzer 
(1984) suggested  the  development  of optimal 
pricing  strategies  over time,  as a fruitful  area 
for  investigation.  Recent  contributions  have 
taken  up this suggestion.  In contrast  to price 
promotion  models,  they  deal  almost  exclu- 
sively  with  durable  products.  A  schematic 
overview  of  some  recen  new  product  and 
dynamic pricing models is given in Table 3. I3 
Recent  contributions  extend  the  previous lit- 
erature  mainly  along  two  lines  by  (i)  more 
extensive  modeling  of  underlying  consumer 
behavior,  and (ii) paying explicit attention  to 
competitive  reactions  typical  in new product 
settings.  Both aspects are considered  in turn. 
8.1  Consumer reaction to  new products:  The 
black box ajar 
A  first  set  of  models  elaborates  on  the 
dynamic  pricing  literature  by  modeling  the 
underlying  consumer  behavior.  Kohli  and 
Mahajan  (1991) propose  a  model  to  deter- 
mine  profit  maximizing prices  for new prod- 
uct  concepts  screened  by  conjoint  analysis. 
l3  These  models  are  briefly  analyzed  below. A more extensive 






Nascimento  and  Moorthy 
Vanhonacker  (1988) 
(1988) 















multiple  periods  multiple  periods  multiple  periods 
price trajectory  single price,  LT  price trajectory 
optimum 
no  yes 
(exp.  curve) 
no 
aggregate  consumers  choose  aggregate 
diffusion  product with  max  diffusion 
model  with  surplus/  and for copies 
















monopoly  (differentiated) 
oligopoly 
multiple  periods  multiple  periods  multiple  periods  multiple periods 
static price equili-  price trajectory  price trajectory  price trajectory 
brium and product 
positioning 
no  experience  curve  experience  curve  experience  curve 
consumers  choose  aggregate  aggregate  aggregate diffusion 
product with max  diffusion  diffusion  type models 
surplus  model  with  market  model with 
saturation  and/or  saturation  effect 





marketf  different types 
potential  =  of adoption 
fiprice,  income);  (word of mouth) 
word of mouth  effects 
reflects uncertain-  considered: 
ty, expectations,  f f  ,  -  , 0) 
awareness 
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Each  individual’s  reservation  price  is deter- 
mined  by  his  (multiattribute)  utility  for  the 
new  concept,  in  relation  to  his  most  pre- 
ferred  product  in  the  currently  available 
evoked  set.  Besanko  and  Winston  (19%)) 
consider  the  problem  of  optimal  dynamic 
pricing  for  a monopolist  facing  rational  con- 
sumers  who  maximize  intertemporal  utility. 
In  each  period,  the  consumers  weigh  the 
benefits  of buying at  the  observed  price,  and 
buying  in  the  future,  under  the  assumption 
of  rational  behavior  by  both  the  manufac- 
turer  and  other  consumers.  Holak  et  al. 
(1987) investigate  the  role  of consumer  price 
expectations  in  the  adoption  of  innovative 
consumer  durables  (e.g.  PCs,  video).  They 
find that  consumers  incorporate  these  expec- 
tations  into  their  purchase  intention  (in  line 
with  previous  models),  but  in  a very  simple 
way. This  observation  is consistent  with  the 
conce:Jt  of  “limited  consumer  rationality” 
discussed  in Sections  4 and  6. Kalish  (1985) 
introduces  uncertainty  about  product  perfor- 
mance  in  the  consumer’s  choice  behavior. 
New product  adoption  is modeled  as  a two- 
stage  process:  the  consumer  first  becomes 
aware  of  the  product  (i.e.  of  search  at- 
tributes)  through  advertising  and  word  of 
mouth.  Next,  he  adopts  if  the  risk-adjusted 
value  exceeds  the  selling  price;  uncertainty 
about  product  performance  (experience  at- 
tributes)  is  reduced  as  the  number  of 
adopters  increases.  In a similar  vein, Dhebar 
and Oren  (1985) analyze  dynamic  pricing  for 
a  monopolist  marketing  a  new  product  or 
service  whose  utility  increases  with  the  ex- 
pansion  of  the  network  of  adopters.  The 
analysis  is  relevant  for  many  new  product 
situations  (e.g.  telecommunications).  In  its 
present  form,  however,  it  is still  rather  sim- 
ple:  consumers  can  leave  the  network  with- 
out  cost,  as  a  consequence  of  which  price 
anticipations  do  not  affect  adoption.  Nasci- 
mento  and  Vanhonacker  (1988) consider  the 
pricing  problem  for  a consumer  durable  that 
can  be  obtained  through  purchase  or  rcpro- 
duction  (piracy).  High product  prices  tend  to 
encourage  piracy,  resulting  in an opportunity 
loss for  the  manufacturer;  profit  maximizing 
price trajectories  are then  derived  using opti- 
mal control  theory.  Smith  (1986) determines 
the  optimal  price  level  for  a  new  durable 
product  in a market  where  competitors  with 
varying  quality  and  market  penetration  level 
are  already  present.  Each  consumer  selects 
the product  that  maximizes his surplus, which 
in  turn  depends  on  item  price,  quality  and 
market  penetration  level. Horsky  (1990) con- 
siders  a framework  where  reservation  prices 
(hence,  the  potential  market)  for  a  new 
durable  are  a  function  of  product  benefits, 
and  of  consumer  income.  The  probability 
that  dn  eligible  consumer  buys  at  a  certain 
point  in time (implicitly)  depends  on his level 
of awareness,  on quality  uncertainty,  and  on 
price  expectations,  which  are  related  to  the 
level  of  adoption.  In  all  these  models,  dy- 
namic pricing  is triggered  by demand  hetero- 
geneity  and  “shaped”  by  the  characteristics 
of consumer  behavior,  which  have  a consid- 
erable  impact  on optimal  pricing  patterns. 
In all the foregoing models,  consumers  are 
assumed  to have complete  knowledge of cur- 
rent  prices,  and  to exhibit  rational  behavior. 
Cost  dynamics  are  not  included.  A  further 
simplifying  assumption  is that  competition  is 
absent  or  does  not  react;  the  impact  of  the 
adopted  pricing  strategy  on  market  entrance 
by  potential  rivals  is  also  disregarded.  In 
1984,  Markham  and  Little  already  men- 
tioned  this  lack of consideration  of competi- 
tive  issues  to  be  a  severe  limitation,  and 
stressed  the  crucial  impact  of  competitive 
behavior  on  price  decisions.  Some  authors 
have  tried  to  fill this gap,  as discussed  next. 
8.2 New product pricing:  Ready for  the com- 
petitive battle 
Table  3  indicates  which  models  consider 
compctitivc  forces  in a  new  product  setting. 
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dynamic  pricing  to  an  undifferentiated 
oligopoly,  and  investigate  Nash  equilibrium 
price  paths  under  various  cost  and  demand 
conditions.  Eliashberg  and  Jeuland  (1986) 
look at dynamic  pricing  for a new durable  in 
two subsequent  stages:  the  monopoly  period, 
and,  after  competitor  entry,  the  subsequent 
duopoly  stage.  Moorthy  (1988) considers  the 
case  of  two  identical  firms,  which  sequen- 
tially enter  the market  and compete  on prod- 
uct  quality  and  price.  They  face  consumers 
who  are  perfectly  informed,  prefer  high  to 
low quality,  and  differ  in their  willingness  to 
pay for quality.  The  analysis  is limited  to the 
static duopoly; only equilibrium  levels of price 
and  quality  are  considered.  Typical  of  this 
contribution  is that  it  treats  the  problem  of 
pricing  and  product  positioning  simultane- 
ously. This is also done  by Choi et al. (1990), 
who  extend  the  analysis  to  a  multidimen- 
sional  characteristics  space.  They  derive  the 
Stackelberg-Nash  equilibrium  price  and 
product  position  for a new entrant,  anticipat- 
ing short  term  price reactions  by incumbents. 
Dockner  and  Jorgenson  (1988) analyze  opti- 
mal  price  trajectories  for  oligopolists,  and 
suggest  that  when  imitation  or cost  learning 
effects  dominate,  dynamic  prices  are  below 
the static  levels. If saturation  effects are  rela- 
tively  important  h/owever, dynamic  price  lev- 
els  will  be  higher  than  those  chosen  by  a 
myopic oligopolist. 
We conclude  that  dynamic  pricing  models 
clearly  demonstrate  the  impact  of  antici- 
pated  competitive  reactions  on  optimal 
strategies;  unfortunately,  the  results  remain 
highly  fragmented.  Each  model  exhibits  dif- 
ferent  specific characteristics  and simplifying 
assumptions.  It seems  that  developing  a gen- 
eral  model  of dynamic  pricing will not  easily 
yield clear analytical  results,  and will necessi- 
tate  recourse  to  simulation  or  computation. 
Also,  more  documentation  is needed  of  dy- 
namic  pricing  processes  that  prevail  in prac- 
tice,  and  of  dynamic  conditions  on  the  cost 
and demand  side. The  “normative”  modcling 
contributions  should  be  supplemented  with 
pragmatic  observations  and  guidelines  for 
dynamic  pricing. An effort  in this direction  is 
made  by  Stern  (1986, 1989), who recognizes 
that  differences  in  competitive  position  are 
primarily  determined  by only a few factors. If 
it wants to respond successfully to (the threat 
of) competitor  entry,  a company  must  iden- 
tify  the  key  differences  in  competitive 
strengths  and weaknesses.  It should then  es- 
tablish  a  price  structure  that  distinguishes 
between  those  customers  and  products  for 
which  its  position  is  threatened,  and  those 
for which  it is secure.  An  example would be 
an  airline  setting  prices  by  route  without 
regard  to route  length. Such a price structure 
could reflect  the ability of low cost carriers  to 
be  more  competitive  on  denser  routes.  This 
will  allow  for  flexible  and  selective  adapta- 
tion of price  levels in response  to a competi- 
tive entry  (or change  in strategy).  Such flexi- 
ble  strategies  appear  particularly  rewarding 
in markets  characterized  by high percentages 
of fiied  costs, and by short-lived  inventories. 
The  author  provides  several  real  life exam- 
ples  that  support  his  view,  and  the  frame- 
work of Tellis (in a dynamic  competitive  set- 
ting, price  structures  that  exploit competitive 
position  might be of particular  interest). 
Crucial  here  is the  (often  limited)  ability 
of a company  to assess potential  competitive 
responses.  The  normative  models  discussed 
above  unrealistically  assume  that  rivals  act 
with  full  information  and  rationality.  In  a 
recent  article,  Coughlan and Mantrala  (1992) 
show  that  “full  information”  model  predic- 
tions  are  not  robust  to  informational  limita- 
tions;  when competitors  are  not  fully knowl- 
edgeable  about  their  rivals’  optimization 
problems  but  update  their  information  over 
time,  the  nature  and  the  timing of the  price 
equilibrium  may  be  strongly  affected.  They 
call for approaches  that:  “.  . .  better  capture 
the incomplete  information  facing a firm in a 
competitive  marketplace”. 
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growing  attention  to  estimating  competitive 
reaction  functions  empirically  (for  a  discus- 
sion,  see  e.g.  Cooper  and  Nakanishi,  1989; 
Hanssens  et  al.,  1990; Alsem  et  al.,  1989). 
Desarbo  et al. (1987) emphasize  the “inertia” 
that  naturally  exists  in  price  change  deci- 
sions, and  propose  a “friction”  model with  a 
threshold  for  both  price  increases  and  de- 
creases.  An  analysis  of  the  PIMS  data  by 
Robinson  (1988)  suggests  that  competitive 
reactions  (to  a  new  market  entry)  may  be 
much less aggressive than  suggested  by many 
“normative”  models.  These  contributions 
provide  the  start  of  an  extremely  relevant 
line  of  research.  A  systematic  approach  to 
the  assessment  of (dynamic)  competitive  re- 
action  functions,  and  their  impact  on  appro- 
priate  pricing  schemes  in  different  settings, 
seems interesting  to pursue. 
9.  Measurement  of price  effects 
The  development  and  monitoring  of  ap- 
propriate  pricing  strategies  requires  some 
quantification  of price effects.  In this section, 
we summarize  some implications  of the  fore- 
going  discussion  on  price  impact  measure- 
ment,  and  briefly  (re)consider  alternative 
methods  in pricing  research. 
9.1 A  hierarchy of price effects 
Recent  marketing  contributions  structure 
the  influence  of price  in  a number  of steps: 
as with  the  “hierarchy  of effects”  for  adver- 
tising,  we  can  distinguish  different  “stages” 
in  the  consumer’s  reaction  towards  prices 
and’ price  changes.  As  indicated  in  Fig.  1, 
objective prices  are  translated  into  price per- 
ceptions.  These,  in  conjunction  with  other 
influencing  factors,  form  the  basis  for  price 
evaluation.  Depending  on  the  outcome  of 
this  process,  the  consumer  may  intend  to 
purchase  the  product,  which  may  finally  re- 
sult in a  purchasing act. 
Traditionally,  more  emphasis  has  been 
placed on the last levels in this hierarchy,  the 
measurement  of  the  price  impact  on  pur- 
chase intentions  or sales. From  the  foregoing 
discussion,  it  appears  useful  to  investigate 
initial  or  intermediate  price  reactions.  In- 
deed,  it  has  been  argued  that  varying  levels 
of price  awareness  and  knowledge,  and  per- 
ceived price-quality  associations,  provide  the 
rationale  for different  pricing  strategies. 
9.2 Measuring price effects: A  tricky issue 
The  measurement  of price  effects  m gen- 
eral,  and  the  assessment  of sales  price  elas- 
ticities  in particular,  is not  an easy task. rom 
the (recent)  literature,  a host of complicating 
factors  emerge.  The  following key issues can 
be identified: 
(i)  Dynamics.  Price  effects  are  dynamic 
in  many  ways.  Reference  Price  Theory  sug- 
gests  that  consumer  price  perception  and 
evaluation  may involve comparison  with past 
or  (anticipated)  future  prices.  Reactions  to 
temporary  price  cuts  may  be  different  from 
those caused  by regular  price changes.  Adap- 
tations  of  price  strategies  could  cause  sales 
displacement  over time; they may also trigger 
competitive  reactions.  Finally,  price  evalua- 
tion and sensitivity  may greatly  alter  over the 
product’s  life  cycle.  Accounting  for  (all  of) 
these  dynamics  constitutes  a real  challenge. 
(ii)  Impact  of  choice  context.  As  empha- 
sized  by  Krishnamurthi  and  Raj  (1991)’ the 
consumer’s purchasing  decision  involves both 
a  quantity  and  a  choice  aspect.  Depending 
on  the  salient  purchasing  component,  abso- 
lute  or  relative  prices  may be  more  relevant. 
If relative  prices  are  used,  appropriate  selec- 
tion of the  “evoked  set” of competitive  prod- 
ucts  is  an  issue.  In  addition,  and  especially 
for  consumer  goods,  store  choice  and  prod- 
uct selection  may be closely linked,  and (rel- 
ative)  store  price  image  may  complement  or 
dominate  item  price  effects. 
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variables. Recent  articles  provide  evidence of 
interdependencies  between  price  and  adver- 
tising/promotion,  quality/brand  position, 
and  distribution.  The  magnitude  and  even 
direction  of these  interactions  may be highly 
context  specific,  and  depend  on  nonprice 
marketing  mix activities.  As  pointed  out  by 
Tellis (1988) and implied by Sethuraman  and 
Tellis (1991), this inhibits  their  measurement 
in  practice,  and  places  severe  requirements 
L t:  data. 
(iv)  Consumer heterogeneity. It has become 
obvious that  consumers  cannot  be treated  as 
homogeneous.  Individuals  exhibit  strong  dif- 
ferences  in  terms  of  price  awareness  and 
knowledge.  “Total”  price  levels,  including 
e.g.  search  and  transaction  costs,  and  non- 
monetary  elements,  also  vary  considerably 
between  consumers,  and  affect  their  reac- 
tion.  Differences  in  sensitivity  to  perceived 
prices  explain  many  of  the  buying  patterns 
and  pricing  strategies  observed  in  practice. 
Hence,  identifying consumer  segments is 
a relevant  task. 
thus 
(v)  Impact  of  psychological factors.  Psy- 
chological  elements  (hard  to  quantify)  may 
mediate  the  “creation”  of price  effects.  The 
use  of  specific  price  endings,  the  deriva+‘>n 
of  “price  beliefs”  from  higher  order  at- 
tributes,  measures  of perceived  risk and risk 
aversion, considerably  “colour”  consumer re- 
actions to objective  prices. 
These  issues  (our  list  is  not  exhaustive) 
make  the  assessment  of price  effects  a most 
difficult undertaking. 
9.3 Approaches  to the measurement  of price 
effects 
Various  methods  have  been  proposed  to 
estimate  price  effects. In very general  terms, 
we distinguish  between  (i) methods  involving 
primary  data  collection,  through  surveys  tir 
experiments,  and  (ii) approaches  relying  on 
historical  information  concerning  prices, 
sales,  and  possibly other  variables.  Depend- 
ing  on  the  level  of  measurement,  different 
approaches  may be appropriate. 
9.3.1 Analysis of price perceptions 
Studies  on  price  perception  (awareness, 
encoding,  knowledge)  require  the  collection 
of data  from consumers. As indicated  in Sec- 
tion  4, the  conditions  under  which  data  are 
obtained  as well as the measures  used, greatly 
differ  between  applications,  and  affect  the 
results.  The  discussion of which approach  or 
Table  4 
Overview  of experimental  pricing  research methods a 
Monadic 
Direct  statement  Indirect  study 
Competitive 
Sequential choices  Random choices 
of price thresholds 
Direct  questioning 
approach 
(“Psychological pricing”) 
(Stoetzel,  1954) 
of price acceptance 
Random  test of 
buying response 
(Gabor  and Granger,  1965) 
Brand price dual 
matrix (Sampson, 1977) 
Random shop situation 
(Granger  and Sowter. 1970) 
Buy scale  Magnitude  scaling  Brand price-tradeoff  Simulated shopping 
(Lodge,  1981)  (RBL,  1979)  experiments 
Price sensitivity meter  Price categorization  Conjoint analysis 
(van Westendorp,  1976)  (Monroe,  1981) 
Source:  Adapted  from  Marbeau  (1987). 
‘I  For  a  description  of  these methods  and  a complete  overview of  the original  references.  .  see e.g. Marbeau  (1987)  and  Monroe 
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setting  is  most  -ppropriate  has  only  just 
started. 
9.3.2 Experimental  research  on price  ecaha- 
lions and  purchase in  ten  tigns 
With price  evaluation  and  purchase  inten- 
tions  as  the  variable  of  interest,  a  whole 
range  of research  techniques  can be  applied. 
A  brief  discussion  of  these  approaches  can 
be  found  in Marbeau  (1987)  and  in Monroe 
(1990); Table  4 provides  a overview. Some of 
the  methods  (e.g. the  price  sensitivity  meter 
suggested  by  van  Westendorp,  the  direct 
questioning  approach  developed  by Stoetzel) 
refer  to  very  specific  instruments  that  have 
existed  for  a long time.  Others,  such  as con- 
joint  measurement  or  simulated  shopping, 
refer  to  broader  lines  of  questioning  or  ex- 
perimental  settings,  within  which  several 
variants  have (recently)  been  developed.  The 
techniques  mentioned  in table  4 are  typically 
applied  in a laboratory  setting. 
A  major  distinction  between  these  meth- 
ods  is the  type of  decision  presented  to  the 
consumers.  The  approach  is  either  “mona- 
dic”  (the  consumer  evaluates  one  concept), 
or  “competitive”  (the  respondent  chooses  a 
product  out of a given set).  Another  aspect  is 
whether  the  approach  is  direct  or  indirect; 
i.e.  whether  the  consumer  is  asked  openly 
about  his attitude  towards  prices  or  the  pur- 
pose  of  the  research  is less  obvious,  for  in- 
stance  because  various  price  levels  are  pre- 
sented  in random  order.  Further  differences  a__ 
relate  to  cost and frexibiiity, and  to  the  link 
of the experiment with actual purchase  situa- 
tions. 
Recent  articles  (Puliyel  and  Ravi,  1990; 
Blamires,  1987; Marbeau,  1987) seem  to  fa- 
vor the Tradeoff  or Conjoint  approaches  over 
monadic  methods  in terms  of reliability  and 
validity  of  estimated  effects.  The  type  of 
product  and  purchasing  situation  involved 
affects  the  appropriateness  of various  mcth- 
ods.  Blamires  points  out  that  for  Tradeoff 
analysis  to  be  a  rclcvant  instrument  for 
measuring  price  effects: “ . . .  (i) the  informa- 
tion  in  the  interview  should  be  comparable 
to  that  in  a  true  purchase  situation,  (ii)  the 
choice  op*,ians should  be  clearly  delineated, 
and  (iii)  the  respondent  should  be  able  to 
quickly evaluate  the  alternatives  on the  basis 
of available  information”. 
This  leads  us  to  an  overall  evaluation  of 
experimental  approaches.  In  general,  these 
methods  have  the  advantage  of  allowing for 
individual  level ana ysis in a highly controlled 
setting,  in which  a  ariety  of qualitative  and 
quantitative  factors  can  be  manipulated.  In 
addition,  experime  ts  can  handle  not  only 
“existing”  products,  but  also  new  product 
(concepts)  that  are  ot yet commercialized  or 
even  manufacture  On  the  negative  side, 
the potential  of these  methods  for identifying 
dynamic  price  s  seems  rather  limited, 
since  repeated  and  questioning  make 
the  task  tedious  a  the  experiment  lengthy. 
Also, several  t  o external  validity  may 
compromise  the  results.  The  experiment 
could  artificially  increase  the  respondent’s 
price  awareness  or  sensitivity,  especially  if 
more  direct  questioning  is  used.  Given  the 
observed  lack  of  price  knowledge,  thif  may 
be  an  important  problem.  Also,  stated  pur- 
chase  intentions  may  be  bad  indicators  of 
real  purchase  behavior. 
However,  recent  progress  in  data  collec- 
tion  and  analysis  has  improved  the  applica- 
bility  and  relevance  of  experimental  ap- 
proaches  (and  more  specifically  Tradeoff 
analysis).  Blamires  ( 1987)  mentions  Com- 
puter  Aided  Questioning  (which  limits  the 
respondent’s  task, and renders  it more realis- 
tic),  the  tendency  to  consider  individual- 
tailored  evoked  sets  and  the  possibility  of 
dca!ing  with  multi-unit  or  multi-brand  pur- 
chases. 
9.3.3 Econometric  assessment of price elastici- 
ties 
Direct  asscssmc  t  of  price  elasticities  is 
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historical  information.  Traditionally,  aggre- 
gate  (as  opposed  to  individual  level)  data 
have been  available  for this  purpose.  Recent 
meta  analyses  by Tellis  (1988) and  Sethura- 
man  and  Tellis  (1991), as well as other  em- 
pirical  studies  (e.g. Bolton,  1989a, b) provide 
interesting  insights  into  the  impact of prob- 
lem-specific and environmental character!stics 
(e.g. type  of product,  stage  of life cycle, geo- 
graphical  setting,  promotional  activity  in the 
category,  . . . )  on  the  level  of  price  elastici- 
ties. 
These  studies  also  point  to  a  number  of 
pitfalls. Measured  price  effects  may  depend 
on  (i)  the  functional  form  chosen  for  the 
sales  response  curve,  e.g.  linear,  multiplica- 
tive, other,  (ii) inclusion  of other  explanatory 
variables  (e.g.  quality,  advertising,  distribu- 
tion,  trend  or  seasonal  dummies),  (iii)  the 
type  of  data  (time  series  versus  cross-sec- 
tional,  periodicity),  (iv) the  measure  for  the 
dependent  variable  (e.g. sales, market  share), 
(v)  the  definition  of  the  price  variable  (ab- 
solute  versus  relative,  real  (deflated)  versus 
nominal,  unit  price  versus  price  per  pack, 
regular  versus promotional  price level). Each 
option  concentrates  on  (or  omits)  aspects  of 
the  multifaceted  price  impact,  and yields  dif- 
ferent  results.  Researchers  and  practitioners 
should  be  aware  of  this  before  using  esti- 
mates  as a basis for price  setting. 
The  opportunities  for  identifying  dynamic 
price  effects,  for  assessing  marketing  mix in- 
teractions,  and  for  dealing  with  consumer 
heterogeneity  or  psychological  factors,  will 
strongly  depend  on  the  characteristics and 
quality of the data set. 
Typically,  time series  data  lack price varia- 
tion, making  it  hard  to  obtain  reliable  esti- 
mates  of  price  effects.  Using  cross-sectional 
(between  brand)  differences  to  assess  the 
price  impact  is not  a “perfect  remedy”  here, 
since  a  different  type  of  sensitivity  may  be 
measured  (Tellis,  1988). 
Multicollinearity often  prevents  US  from 
disentangling  price  and  other  marketing  mix 
effects  (e.g.  Moriarty,  1985; Bolton,  1989a; 
Walters,  1991; Walters and McKenzie, 1988). 
Given  that  interactions  may  be  important, 
caution  is  needed.  Several  transformations 
have been  suggested to technically  overcome 
collinearity  problems  (e.g.  Cooper  and 
Nakanishi,  1988), but  the  appropriate  inter- 
pretation  of  the  transformed  effects  should 
be  considered.  Natural  experiments  may  be 
needed  to  discern  price  effects  from  other 
influences. 
The  level and type of data aggregation de- 
serves  specific  attention.  Monthly  or  bi- 
monthly  data  cannot  distinguish  between 
regular  and  promotional  price  effects, while 
the  literature  reveals  that  promotional  price 
cuts  normally  result  in  more  negative  short 
term  elasticities  (e.g.,  Bolton,  1989a; Bem- 
maor  and  Mouchoux,  1991). Temporally  dis- 
aggregate  scanner  data  may overcome  these 
problems,  but  the  accuracy  and  representa- 
tiveness  of these  data  in a European  setting 
is still  far  from  perfect.  Market  (as opposed 
to store)  level information  ignores important 
differences  between  retail  outlets  in  price 
level, product  assortment,  and customer  pro- 
file as well as their impact on estimated  price 
effect.  Both manufacturers  and retailers  may 
find it in their  interest  to consider data at the 
channel  type  or  even  store  level  to  avoid 
aggregation  errors  of this  type  (e.g. Vanden 
Abeele  and Vanhuele,  1988; Marbeau,  1987). 
Finally,  market  (as  opposed  to  individual 
level)  response  functions  forego  the  hetero- 
geneity  and  complexity  of  consumer  behav- 
ior,  and  may  lead to  unjustified  predictions. 
As suggested by some of the reviewed contri- 
butions,  consumers  may adapt  their behavior 
when  facing  a change  in price  strategy,  and 
this may result  in altered  price  elasticities  at 
the  market  level.  Many  recent  empirical 
analyses  take  advantage  of the  availability of 
(scanner)  panel  data  to  study  individual  or 
segment  level reactions  to price changes (e.g. 
Grover  and  Srinivasan,  1992;  Lattin  and 
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As  indicated  below,  further  exploration  of 
scanner  panel  information  and  individual 
level studies  constitute,  in our opinion,  a very 
fruitful  and  promising  line  of research. 
10.  Conclusion-directions  for  future  re- 
search 
The  last  six years  of  pricing  research  in 
marketing  have  provided  valuable  new  in- 
sights  as well  as confirmed  previous  beliefs. 
The  recent  literature  forced  both  marketing 
managers  and  scholars  to  better  recognize 
the  full  complexity of  the  pricing  problem, 
implying  that  more  “advanced”  pricing 
schemes  may  be  called  for  to  exploit  profit 
opportunities  in the  market.  As Stern  (1986) 
puts  it:  “.  . .  managers  who  merely  set  price 
levels rather  than  explicit  price  structures  for 
their  products  deprive  themselves  of  a valu- 
able  strategic  tool”,  and  “As  markets  be- 
come  increasingly  competitive,  the  flexibility 
imparted  by  more  complex  price  structures 
can only grow in value”. 
There  has been  an  improvement  and  shift 
in attention  to the  theoretical foundations  of 
pricing  strategies.  Many  papers  shed  light on 
the  principles  behind  typical  pricing  strate- 
gies,  and  identify  market  conditions  that 
make  these  profitable.  Empirical  research 
proves  the  relevance  of  these  conditions  in 
many  markets,  and  heips  managers  to  iden- 
tify  their  situation.  Still,  as  John  Little  puts 
it,  “there  is  little  risk  of  running  out  of 
pricing  problems”.  Indeed,  though  recent 
contributions  have  provided  interesting 
frameworks  and more  detailed  insights, many 
issues  remain  unresolved,  and  new problems 
are  uncovered. 
Future  research  may  concentrate  on  the 
following topics: 
1.  Development  of  managerial  guidelines for 
pricing.  The complexity  of pricing may lcavc 
managers  helpless  to  face  real  lift  decisions. 
The  creative  use  of price  structures  requires 
a  strong  understanding  of  consumer  valua- 
tion,  of  competitive  position,  and  of  cost 
behavior  (Stern,  1986). As stressed  by Cough- 
lan  and  Mantrala  (1992), complete  informa- 
tion  is seldom  available  to companies,  which 
may  be  confronted  with  conditions  in which 
a  mixture  of  pricing  strategies  is necessary. 
More  than  the  basic pricing  principle  has  to 
be decided  upon:  the  manager  must set con- 
crete  price  levels,  which  are  in  line  with 
other  elements  of the  marketing  policy. The 
practical  control  and  administration  of these 
complex  pricing  schemes  is  a  still  different 
and complex  matter. 
There  is a gap  between  the  “state  of  the 
art”  on  pricing  in  the  marketing  literature, 
and  managerial  practice.  While  the  strategic 
(planning)  literature  pays  attention  to  com- 
prehensive  pricing guidelines,  marketing  con- 
tributions  seem  to  fall  somewhat  short.  An 
attempt  at  developing  a  strategic  pricing 
framework  for managers  is provided  by Can- 
non  and  Morgan  (1991). Their  ideas  are  in- 
teresting,  but  the  pricing  strategies  they  con- 
sider  and  the  rules  they  provide  remain  very 
general  and  (overly)  pragmatic.  A  fruitful 
area  for  future  work  is the  development  of 
knowledge  based  pricing  systems  to  help 
managers  decide  on  appropriate  pricing 
schemes  in  their  particular  situation.  The 
knowledge  base  behind  such  a  system  could 
draw  upon  managerial  experience  as well as 
on empirical  and  theoretical  insights. 
2. Continued empirical research  on consumer 
price  sensitivity.  There  is a  need  to  further 
explore  consumer  price  sensitivity  in  differ- 
ent  situations.  In doing  so,  it seems  particu- 
larly valuable  to combine  various  approaches 
and  information  sources. 
Analysis  of  aggregate  response  functions 
(e.g. using store or market  level scanner  data) 
in  different  markets  remains  very  valuable, 
since  it  provides  managers  with  objective 
elasticity  figures.  Many  data  sources,  espe- E,  Gijsbrechts  /  Prices and pricing  research  in consumer  marketing  147 
cially  at  the  retail  level,  are  underutilized, 
and  more  insight  is  needed  into  the  sales 
response  and  profitability  of  actual  pricing 
strategies.  As argued  in Section 9, one should 
handle  such estimates  with caution. 
The  assessment  of  price  elasticities  from 
historical  data  should  continue,  but may ben- 
efit  from  additional  insights  into  consumer 
behavior  obtained  in  experimental  settings. 
Simulated  purchase  situations  and  protocol 
analysis  could  clarify  the  role of price  in the 
decision  process  for  different  types  of prod- 
ucts and consumers,  while external validity of 
these  findings  can  be  obtained  through 
econometric  analysis of historical  data. 
3. Increased  attention for  the role of  retailers 
(intermediaries).  Pricing  research  in market- 
ing has begun to recognize  the crucial  role of 
retailers  in  the  development  of  pricing 
strategies.  The  following  issues  need  to  be 
further  explored: 
(i)  Interactions  between  manufacturers 
and  retailers  in  pricing  decisions.  Manufac- 
turers,  especially  the  smaller  or less powerful 
ones, should concentrate  more on developing 
appropriate  pricing  strategies  towards  retail- 
ers  or  distributors  and  take  the  reaction  of 
these  middlemen  into account  in setting  con- 
sumer  prices.  The  role  of the  retail  account 
manager  and/or  salespeople  may be  impor- 
tant  in price negotiations  in the channel  (e.g. 
Lal, 1986; Hardy,  19861, and needs  attention. 
(ii)  The  profitability  of  pricing  strategies 
at  the  retail  level. Theoretical  and  empirical 
insight  is  needed  on  the  impact  of  price 
strategies  on intra-  and  interstore  brand  sub- 
stitution,  and  on  sales  of  complementary 
products.  The  role  of  price  in  store  choice 
and  the  formation  of  store  price  images 
should  be further  investigated,  since they  are 
closely  linked  to retailer  profitability. 
4. Research  on strategic pricing and  competi- 
tive price reactions.  The  importance  of com- 
petitive  conditions  is  widely  supported  by 
recent  work.  Empirical  analyses  suggest that 
many  practitioners  use  competitive  prices  as 
a benchmark  for their  own decisions (Abratt 
and Pitt,  1985). Model based,  normative con- 
tributions  confirm the relevance  of anticipat- 
ing  competitive  moves  for  optimal  pricing. 
Though  the  importance  of competitive  inter- 
actions  is  clearly  accepted,  their  impact  on 
practical  pricing  rules  needs  further  exami- 
nation.  Theoretical  models  are  often  re- 
stricted  to  the  duopoly  case,  and  in  many 
instances  assume  fully  informed  companies 
and optimal  competitive  reactions. 
Empirical  evidence  on  how rivals react  in 
real  life  settings  is  now  emerging  but  far 
from  complete.  More  attention  is needed  to 
the  patterns  of  competitive  price  reaction 
typical  for  different  markets  or  product 
classes. 
5.  Multiproduct  pricing.  Previous  reviews 
stated  that  pricing a  product  line or  even  a 
wide  product  assortment  (certainly  for  the 
retailer)  poses  very  particular  pricing  prob- 
lems and  opportunities.  The  striking feature 
of multiproduct  research  is its scarcity. Only 
very few models pay attention  to competitive 
interactions  (this  is somewhat  curious,  since 
market  preemption  is  recognized  as one  of 
the  possible  purposes  of a product  line sttat- 
egy). Further  insight is needed  into the  psy- 
chological  and  behavioral  impact  of product 
line  prices  on consumers  in the  presence  of 
other  choice  determinants  (brand  name, 
package  size, taste,  quality  level, etc). At the 
same  time,  empirical  evidence  on  cannibal- 
ization  (substitution)  and  complementarity 
under  different  pricing strategies  needs to be 
collected,  and can seme  as a basis for practi- 
cal pricing guidelines. 
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